A Psychological Theory of Moral Truth

There is a big difference between factual statements and statements that express strong emotions or demands (Messerly, 2016). When you claim that something is a fact (for example, "Trees get their energy from photosynthesis" or "23 is a prime number"), this claim is either true or false. On the other hand, when you express your feelings about something (for example, "Indiana Jones—wow!") or urge someone to do something (for example, "You need to see Indiana Jones and the Dial of Destiny this afternoon!"), these exclamatory statements merely express feelings or desires; they are not factual claims and are therefore neither true nor false.

There is little controversy about the notion that some sentences are intended to state objectively true facts and some sentences are intended to express personal feelings and desires. However, the issue is less clear for moral statements such as "Abortion is wrong" or "You have a duty to pay your taxes." Are moral statements just expressions of personal feelings or do they represent true facts?

A Psychological Approach to Understanding Moral Pronouncements

Philosophers have debated this question at length (Marturano, n.d.). Rather than approach the issue philosophically, I have preferred to investigate the question from the perspective of psychological theory and empirical evidence. My research has concluded that people honestly believe that their declarations of right and wrong are true facts, but that these beliefs are mistaken. Moral statements do not actually communicate true facts, but, rather, express personal feelings of approval or disapproval. These emotional expressions are attempts to persuade others to share those feelings and act accordingly. For the details supporting this conclusion, see Johnson (1995, 2007). For the purpose of this post, I'll summarize some points from my research.

First, it is an undeniable fact that people often have very strong feelings about moral issues like abortion, capital punishment, discrimination, euthanasia, and sexual behavior, and that we often express our approval or disapproval about these issues with great passion to persuade others to take our own view and act in ways that are consistent with our view. For example, people who say that abortion is wrong are expressing strong negative feelings about abortion and are attempting to prevent people from seeking abortions.

Second, scientific facts are normally communicated without passion and are not intended to motivate people to action. In the words of Linda Skitka (2010, p. 270), "recognition that water molecules are two parts hydrogen and one part oxygen has no motivational corollary or mandate. Recognition that trees photosynthesize or that 13 is a prime number inspires no action, nor justification for action."

Because moral pronouncements typically involve strong feelings and demands for desired actions, they resemble attempts to influence behavior more than statements of true facts.

At the same time, it is also a fact that people often use the term "moral truth" and act as if moral statements are expressing true facts. In other words, people experience their moral convictions as objective facts, even if they are only personal feelings. Skitka (2010, p. 270) refers to this as "a Humean paradox," because David Hume demonstrated that moral claims about what ought to be cannot be derived from factual statements about what is. "Moral truth" is a self-contradictory concept. (See also Skitka, et al., 2021.)

How and Why Do People Mistake Moral Feelings for Moral Truths?

What, then, explains how and why people believe in "moral truths," when this concept is a self-contradiction? Again, the details are in my papers (Johnson, 1995, 2007), but here is the basic psychological explanation. First, although not widely recognized, judgments about what is true are often made on emotional grounds. PT blogger Eric Dietrich (2016) has written an excellent post about this. The stronger our feeling, the more certain we are that something is true. This means that our strong feelings about moral issues trick us into thinking that we possess moral truths. Neuropsychology explains how feelings about moral issues are interpreted as truths.

But why did our brains evolve to misperceive strong moral emotions as objectively true facts? This part of the theory is more speculative, but my hunch is that interpreting moral feelings as truths helps to make us more persuasive. It is one thing to demand that you conform to my moral rules because I have strong feelings about my moral principles. A person might respond by saying, "Maybe you feel that way, but I don't." On the other hand, if our brains fool us into thinking that our moral convictions are truths, not just personal feelings, our demands might seem to have a more solid basis in reality. By acting as if a moral pronouncement is objectively true, people can seem more convincing and will be more successful in getting others to comply with their desires.

What are the practical implications of this theory of moral truth? Keeping this theory in mind could help you distinguish between what is the case (what are the facts, what is true, what is objectively real) and what ought to be the case (what you and others want to happen). Distinguishing between what is true and what people want will help you navigate reality effectively and interact fruitfully with others.