BEHAVING BADLY

Behaving Badly: Aversive Behaviors in Interpersonal Relationships examines the dark side of relating, an inevitable part of interacting with others. How is it that we need others so much, indeed rely on them for our survival and well-being, yet often find it so difficult to maintain satisfying relationships? How can the loved one who raises your spirits by leaving flowers for you one day be the same individual who the next day acts like an insensitive jerk? Relationships provide us with meaning and psychological well-being but are the source of many, perhaps most, of life's greatest frustrations.

4

AVERSIVE SELF-PRESENTATIONS

ROOS VONK

Generally, self-presentation is a blessing. Thanks to self-presentational behavior, people do not blatantly yawn when we tell boring stories; they do not jump with joy at funerals, even when they feel like it; and visits to in-laws do not usually end in slanging matches (in Britain, this refers to an argument in which people shout, curse, and insult each other; cf. M. R. Leary, 1995). Self-presentation is the lubricating oil of social traffic. Interactions runs smoothly because people laugh about jokes that are not funny, make compliments about bad hairstyles, and generally allow each other to save face (Goffman, 1959). Thus, self-presentation facilitates social interaction.

Notwithstanding these undeniably important benefits, there is also a dark side to self-presentation, which this chapter is about. In part, this dark side emerges because the images that people project are not always what they had in mind. That is, the secondary impression (i.e., the impression that is actually formed of the self-presenting actor) may deviate from the impression that was calculated and desired by the actor (Schneider, 1981). For instance, an employee who laughs about the corny jokes of his supervisor, aiming to please the supervisor, may cause annoyance or even unease when the extent of his laughter is disproportionate to the funniness of the jokes. Similarly, a potential son-in-law who aims to impress his new in-

laws by describing his many accomplishments may become the object of boredom and aggravation rather than admiration. In these cases, the aversiveness of the self-presentation is unintentional.

In other cases, people knowingly project obnoxious images that others most assuredly find aversive. For instance, supervisors and teachers sometimes present themselves as unusually strict and intimidating toward their subordinates or pupils (E. E. Jones & Pittman, 1982). Probably their goal is not to be liked but instead to be obeyed or even feared. Similarly, members of juvenile gangs may engage in aggressive and even immoral behaviors to impress others (e.g., Horowitz & Schwartz, 1974).

This chapter addresses these two varieties of aversive self-presentations: (a) the ones that are intended to be aversive and (b) the ones that have the effect of being aversive despite the actor's intentions to the contrary. Before discussing the motives and the effects of these self-presentations in more detail, I first present a taxonomy of self-presentational behavior that includes positive as well as negative behaviors, and I describe the motives for self-presentation in general. Subsequently, I discuss the specific motives that people may have for deliberately engaging in negative self-presentations. Finally, I describe how positive self-presentations can become obnoxious, at least in the eye of the observer.

A TAXONOMY OF SELF-PRESENTATIONAL BEHAVIOR

Because people have many interpersonal goals and many ways to accomplish those goals through self-presentational tactics, it may be argued that any behavior can be the result of self-presentational concerns (M. R. Leary, 1995). Therefore, any taxonomy of self-presentational episodes is bound to be either incomprehensive or chaotic. This is also true of the widely cited five-category taxonomy of E. E. Jones and Pittman (1982). To present a reasonably exhaustive and organized inventory of different forms of self-presentation, I have combined their taxonomy with four basic dimensions of personality judgments that have come up consistently in person perception research (for reviews of studies on implicit personality theory, see Schneider, 1973; Vonk 1993a). The result is presented in Table 4.1. The table columns represent four categories of personality dimensions that have been described in the literature on person perception and interpersonal behavior; this literature is specified in the table notes. Note that these dimensions are not orthogonal to each other. In fact, they are all evaluative, and their endpoints merely denote different kinds of "good" (likability, ability, strength, and morality) and "bad" (unlikability, inability, weakness, and immorality). The table rows represent the positive and the negative pole of each dimension. In the cells, several categories of self-

laws by describing his many accomplishments may become the object of boredom and aggravation rather than admiration. In these cases, the aversiveness of the self-presentation is unintentional.

In other cases, people knowingly project obnoxious images that others most assuredly find aversive. For instance, supervisors and teachers sometimes present themselves as unusually strict and intimidating toward their subordinates or pupils (E. E. Jones & Pittman, 1982). Probably their goal is not to be liked but instead to be obeyed or even feared. Similarly, members of juvenile gangs may engage in aggressive and even immoral behaviors to impress others (e.g., Horowitz & Schwartz, 1974).

This chapter addresses these two varieties of aversive self-presentations: (a) the ones that are intended to be aversive and (b) the ones that have the effect of being aversive despite the actor's intentions to the contrary. Before discussing the motives and the effects of these self-presentations in more detail, I first present a taxonomy of self-presentational behavior that includes positive as well as negative behaviors, and I describe the motives for self-presentation in general. Subsequently, I discuss the specific motives that people may have for deliberately engaging in negative self-presentations. Finally, I describe how positive self-presentations can become obnoxious, at least in the eye of the observer.

A TAXONOMY OF SELF-PRESENTATIONAL BEHAVIOR

Because people have many interpersonal goals and many ways to accomplish those goals through self-presentational tactics, it may be argued that any behavior can be the result of self-presentational concerns (M. R. Leary, 1995). Therefore, any taxonomy of self-presentational episodes is bound to be either incomprehensive or chaotic. This is also true of the widely cited five-category taxonomy of E. E. Jones and Pittman (1982). To present a reasonably exhaustive and organized inventory of different forms of self-presentation, I have combined their taxonomy with four basic dimensions of personality judgments that have come up consistently in person perception research (for reviews of studies on implicit personality theory, see Schneider, 1973; Vonk 1993a). The result is presented in Table 4.1. The table columns represent four categories of personality dimensions that have been described in the literature on person perception and interpersonal behavior; this literature is specified in the table notes. Note that these dimensions are not orthogonal to each other. In fact, they are all evaluative, and their endpoints merely denote different kinds of "good" (likability, ability, strength, and morality) and "bad" (unlikability, inability, weakness, and immorality). The table rows represent the positive and the negative pole of each dimension. In the cells, several categories of self-

TABLE 4.1
A Taxonomy of Eight Forms of Self-Presentation Based on Four Dimensions of Personality

Dimension	(Social) Evaluation,[a,b] Likeability,[b,c] Affiliation[d]	Competence, Intellectual Evaluation,[b] Ability[e]	Potency,[a,c] Control[d]	Morality[e]
Positive	*Ingratiation*	*Self-promotion*	Autonomy	*Exemplification*
Negative	Hostility, including *Intimidation*	Playing dumb	*Supplication*	Rebellion

Note. The five categories in italics are described in E. E. Jones and Pitman's taxonomy (1982). [a]Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum (1957): Evaluation, Potency. [b]Rosenberg, Nelson, and Vivekananthan (1968); Rosenberg (1977); M. P. Kim and Rosenberg (1980): Social Evaluation, Intellectual Evaluation/Likeability, Competence. [c]Vonk (1993a, 1995): Likeability, Potency. [d]T. Leary (1957); Kiesler (1983); Wiggins (1985): Affiliation, Control (interpersonal circle). [e]Reeder and Brewer (1979); Skowronski and Carlston (1987); Morality, Ability.

presentation are listed. The five categories printed in italics are the ones described by E. E. Jones and Pittman's taxonomy.

Ingratiation is the positive end of the social evaluation dimension, a dimension that describes the contrast between likable, friendly and unlikable, hostile behavior. The goal of ingratiation is to present the self as likable (E. E. Jones, 1964). The negative end of this dimension encompasses all behaviors by which people present themselves as unlikable or hostile. For instance, people may want to make others believe that they are not friendly or nice because they want to avoid further contact with someone (Schneider, 1981) or because doing so increases their chances of getting a job that requires unlikable qualities (cf. Jellison & Gentry, 1978). *Intimidation*—establishing an impression of dominance and firmness so that others obey or keep quiet—is also a self-presentational style that classifies an individual as unlikable. Furthermore, people may convey that they are tough and uncompromising in, for instance, bargaining settings when they want to lower the opponents' aspirations and discourage them from asking too much (Pruitt & Smith, 1981; Wall, 1991) or when they are observed by their constituents (Carnevale, Pruitt, & Britton, 1979). In the presence of observers, people—especially men—may act aggressively and retaliate against someone who has provoked or exploited them, to demonstrate to the observers that they are not to be trifled with (Brown, 1968; Felson, 1978; cf. Hogan & Jones, 1983, and Horowitz & Schwartz, 1974, on juvenile delinquency and violence in juvenile gangs). In a recent study, S. H. Kim, Smith, and Brigham (1998) suggested that the presence of an observer also affects retaliation as a function of power imbalance. Generally, people retaliate more against a less powerful harm-doer but, in the presence of an observer, retaliation is stronger against a more powerful harm-doer. Presumably, the latter is seen as more justified or even courageous, whereas negative behavior toward a less powerful other is socially

BE

Behaving
Interperso
the dark
inevitabl
with oth
need oth
on them
well-beir
difficult
relations
one who
leaving f
be the sa
next day
jerk? Rel
with mea
well-bein
many, pe
greatest f

undesirable. Thus, in some cases people may actually harm a more powerful person to gain admiration from someone else.

The second dimension in the table is *competence–ability*, which describes the contrast between intelligence and other skills versus incompetence and ignorance. At the positive end of this dimension lies *self-promotion*, a self-presentational tactic that is specifically geared to convincing others of one's abilities. As for its opposite, there are many situations in which people *play dumb*, that is, hide their knowledge or their skills. In the extant literature, seven motives for this type of self-presentation have been described.

1. People may want to avoid an onerous task by acting as if they do not have the ability to perform it (Kowalski & Leary, 1990).
2. Some people deliberately lose poker games or sport matches, thus feigning incompetence to encourage a less skilled opponent to gamble with more money (*hustling*), or they present themselves as incapable to make the opponent reduce his effort or lower his guard (*sandbagging*; Shepperd & Socherman, 1997).
3. People may intentionally fail at a task for which failure is associated with a desirable personality trait (Baumeister, Cooper, & Skib, 1979), or they may engage in self-deprecation in interacting with an attractive target who prefers a self-effacing self-presentation (Gollwitzer & Wicklund, 1985).
4. Children may hide what they know about sex and drugs for the sake of their parents' peace of mind (M. R. Leary, 1995).
5. People may claim low ability to reduce expectations, so as to create lower, more obtainable standards for their performance and avoid a harsh judgment (Baumgardner & Brownlee, 1987; cf. Baumgardner & Arkin, 1987).
6. People sometimes play dumb on a date (e.g., hide their academic achievements; cf. Daubman, Heatherington, & Ahn, 1992) or in an intimate relationship (e.g., allow their partner to win a competition) to bolster the ego of their partner and, in the case of women, to fulfill societal role requirements (e.g., Dean, Braito, Powers, & Brant, 1975; Komarowski, 1946; Zanna & Pack, 1975).[1]
7. People may hide their accomplishments to avoid that others feel intimidated, threatened, or jealous (Exline & Lobel,

[1]According to Gove, Hughes, and Geerken (1980), playing dumb does not occur more frequently among women than among men. However, as can be seen from this overview, there are many varieties of playing dumb and many motives underlying this behavior, and it seems possible that men and women engage in different forms and are driven by different motives.

undesirable. Thus, in some cases people may actually harm a more powerful person to gain admiration from someone else.

The second dimension in the table is *competence–ability*, which describes the contrast between intelligence and other skills versus incompetence and ignorance. At the positive end of this dimension lies *self-promotion*, a self-presentational tactic that is specifically geared to convincing others of one's abilities. As for its opposite, there are many situations in which people *play dumb*, that is, hide their knowledge or their skills. In the extant literature, seven motives for this type of self-presentation have been described.

1. People may want to avoid an onerous task by acting as if they do not have the ability to perform it (Kowalski & Leary, 1990).
2. Some people deliberately lose poker games or sport matches, thus feigning incompetence to encourage a less skilled opponent to gamble with more money (*hustling*), or they present themselves as incapable to make the opponent reduce his effort or lower his guard (*sandbagging*; Shepperd & Socherman, 1997).
3. People may intentionally fail at a task for which failure is associated with a desirable personality trait (Baumeister, Cooper, & Skib, 1979), or they may engage in self-deprecation in interacting with an attractive target who prefers a self-effacing self-presentation (Gollwitzer & Wicklund, 1985).
4. Children may hide what they know about sex and drugs for the sake of their parents' peace of mind (M. R. Leary, 1995).
5. People may claim low ability to reduce expectations, so as to create lower, more obtainable standards for their performance and avoid a harsh judgment (Baumgardner & Brownlee, 1987; cf. Baumgardner & Arkin, 1987).
6. People sometimes play dumb on a date (e.g., hide their academic achievements; cf. Daubman, Heatherington, & Ahn, 1992) or in an intimate relationship (e.g., allow their partner to win a competition) to bolster the ego of their partner and, in the case of women, to fulfill societal role requirements (e.g., Dean, Braito, Powers, & Brant, 1975; Komarowski, 1946; Zanna & Pack, 1975).[1]
7. People may hide their accomplishments to avoid that others feel intimidated, threatened, or jealous (Exline & Lobel, 1999). A recent study by Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee Chai, and Barndollaer (1998) suggested that this type of behavior may even emerge automatically and unintentionally, as a result of the activation of goals ("auto-motives"). In this experiment, participants who were primed with an empathy goal (by means of words such as *friendly* and *cooperation*), compared with participants primed with a performance goal (e.g., *success* and *effort*), showed decreased performance at a task when they were paired with an accomplice who was insecure about his abilities at the task. Thus, by activating an empathy goal, participants automatically played dumb to protect their partner's self-esteem.

Depending on the setting and the motives for playing dumb, this type of self-presentation may not be seen as negative and certainly not as aversive. On the contrary, it seems that many occasions of playing dumb can be regarded as instances of modesty or even ingratiation. Nevertheless, the category is included in the present chapter because ignorance and incompetence are regarded as undesirable. As will become clear in this chapter, many behaviors that are negative on one dimension may be positive on another one, but this does not alter the fact that people sometimes do present themselves in an undesirable way, at least with respect to one dimension. For now, then, all negative poles of the personality dimensions are of interest.

Potency–control is the third dimension that is useful in describing self-presentational behavior. On the negative side of this dimension, *supplication* (E. E. Jones & Pittman, 1982) means that one presents the self as dependent and helpless. The supplicator cultivates the role of a person who is needy and weak, physically ill, or even depressed (Hill, Weary, & Williams, 1986; cf. Kelly, McKillop, & Neimeyer, 1991) or mentally disturbed (Braginsky, 1981). Although this behavior is weak and powerless, it can be as annoying as intimidation and even as aggressive, because it is a strong appeal to feelings of guilt and moral responsibility on the part of the target (cf., Kowalski, 1996). On the other side of the potency dimension is *autonomy*, a self-presentational style that is sometimes confused with absence of self-presentation, that is, with being oblivious to social demands and a tendency to be guided solely by one's private thoughts and feelings (e.g., Buss & Briggs, 1984). However, as demonstrated by Schlenker and Weigold (1990), people may actually change their publicly expressed attitudes merely to demonstrate that they are autonomous. Similarly, self-presentational motives may lead people to convey that they do not need others or do not care what others think.

Finally, with respect to the *morality* dimension, exemplification (e.g., Gilbert & Jones, 1986) represents the positive end of this dimension. This

[1] According to Gove, Hughes, and Geerken (1980), playing dumb does not occur more frequently among women than among men. However, as can be seen from this overview, there are many varieties of playing dumb and many motives underlying this behavior, and it seems possible that men and women engage in different forms and are driven by different motives.

BEI
E

Behaving B
Interpersona
the dark s
inevitable
with othe
need othe
on them f
well-being
difficult t
relationshi
one who r
leaving flo
be the sam
next day a
jerk? Relat
with meani
well-being
many, perh
greatest fr

behavior is enacted by (for example) parents, teachers, and religious leaders to set a moral example by projecting an image of integrity and moral worthiness. Regarding the negative end of morality, note that immoral behavior that results from self-presentational motives does not occur frequently: People do not usually aim to appear more immoral than they really are, because the very essence of morality implies that one does not ever engage in immoral behaviors, even when it is desirable (Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Reeder & Spores, 1983). Mark Leary (personal communication, August 12, 1997) has suggested that in this cell of the table, one might place the behavior of rebellious people who attempt to shock or offend the establishment by ostentatious bad behavior (e.g., shock-rock musical groups). In addition, young people may engage in immoral behaviors to avoid being seen as "goody-two-shoes" by their peers. Exline (1999) has suggested that moral, exemplifying behavior, just as competent behavior, can be seen as threatening by others. Therefore, people may swear or drink or engage in other bad behaviors for the same reasons that they play dumb (Exline & Lobel, 1999): to avoid being seen as threatening by others who might feel guilty, scolded, or "policed" by being around a person who exemplifies the things that they cannot or do not accomplish. In these cases, people may portray themselves as a little bad to make others feel comfortable and to protect themselves from being accused of self-righteousness or feeling superior to others (Exline, 1999).

Motives for Self-Presentation

In addition to facilitating social interaction, self-presentation generally serves the goal of self-enhancement and receiving social approval. This motive implies that self-presenters usually aim to create a glorifying image of the self. Positive self-presentations reduce the risk of being rejected by others, and they can serve to gain all other kinds of material or psychological rewards (e.g., pay raises, respect). However, the motive to be liked is pervasive even when no tangible outcomes are at stake (Baumeister & Leary, 1992).

Nevertheless, negative self-presentations do occur and, because they cannot be accounted for by the motive of self-enhancement and social approval, other motives must be involved. According to E. E. Jones (1964, 1990), self-presentation is a behavioral instrument that serves the goal of making others behave in desired ways. For instance, job applicants attempt to influence the impression formed of them by the interviewer, in such a way that they are more likely to get the job. It follows that self-presentation can take all sorts of forms: A job applicant might present himself or herself as confident or modest, liberal or conservative, sociable or formal, depending on whatever is most advantageous for securing the job. In some cases, it may be desirable to present the self negatively, if this affects others'

behavior is enacted by (for example) parents, teachers, and religious leaders to set a moral example by projecting an image of integrity and moral worthiness. Regarding the negative end of morality, note that immoral behavior that results from self-presentational motives does not occur frequently: People do not usually aim to appear more immoral than they really are, because the very essence of morality implies that one does not ever engage in immoral behaviors, even when it is desirable (Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Reeder & Spores, 1983). Mark Leary (personal communication, August 12, 1997) has suggested that in this cell of the table, one might place the behavior of rebellious people who attempt to shock or offend the establishment by ostentatious bad behavior (e.g., shock-rock musical groups). In addition, young people may engage in immoral behaviors to avoid being seen as "goody-two-shoes" by their peers. Exline (1999) has suggested that moral, exemplifying behavior, just as competent behavior, can be seen as threatening by others. Therefore, people may swear or drink or engage in other bad behaviors for the same reasons that they play dumb (Exline & Lobel, 1999): to avoid being seen as threatening by others who might feel guilty, scolded, or "policed" by being around a person who exemplifies the things that they cannot or do not accomplish. In these cases, people may portray themselves as a little bad to make others feel comfortable and to protect themselves from being accused of self-righteousness or feeling superior to others (Exline, 1999).

Motives for Self-Presentation

In addition to facilitating social interaction, self-presentation generally serves the goal of self-enhancement and receiving social approval. This motive implies that self-presenters usually aim to create a glorifying image of the self. Positive self-presentations reduce the risk of being rejected by others, and they can serve to gain all other kinds of material or psychological rewards (e.g., pay raises, respect). However, the motive to be liked is pervasive even when no tangible outcomes are at stake (Baumeister & Leary, 1992).

Nevertheless, negative self-presentations do occur and, because they cannot be accounted for by the motive of self-enhancement and social approval, other motives must be involved. According to E. E. Jones (1964, 1990), self-presentation is a behavioral instrument that serves the goal of making others behave in desired ways. For instance, job applicants attempt to influence the impression formed of them by the interviewer, in such a way that they are more likely to get the job. It follows that self-presentation can take all sorts of forms: A job applicant might present himself or herself as confident or modest, liberal or conservative, sociable or formal, depending on whatever is most advantageous for securing the job. In some cases, it may be desirable to present the self negatively, if this affects others' behaviors in desired ways. For instance, others may obey (if one intimidates them), take their onerous business elsewhere (if one plays dumb or unskilled), or offer help (in case of supplication).

Self-presentations need not always serve one's own personal goals only, however. Just as people may tell lies for either self-centered or altruistic reasons (DePaulo & Bell, 1996; DePaulo & Kashy, 1998), both motives may also guide self-presentational behavior. For instance, people may play dumb to prevent that they intimidate a more insecure or less educated person. Thus, self-presentational behavior—both positive and negative—may be conducted for the benefit of the target.

Negative Self-Presentations

Self-presentations may be either deliberately or inadvertently aversive. In the overview above, the four negative self-presentations can be classified as intentionally negative: In all four cases, there is a motive to project a negative image—that is, a motive to be seen as unlikable, incompetent, helpless, or immoral, even though self-presenters may not always be fully aware of these motives. Indeed, the entire taxonomy above is based on the actor's intentions. To say that self-promotion is positive on the competence dimension means that the self-promoter intends to be seen as competent and skilled; to classify ingratiation as socially good means that the ingratiating actor has the goal of being seen as likable. However, as noted earlier, the impression intended by the actor may often deviate from the impression that is actually formed by observers. That is, from the perspective of the audience, we might arrive at an entirely different classification of positive and negative self-presentations. In fact, the word *aversive* in the title of this book generally refers to the perspective of the observer or the target of behavior. Behaviors may produce aversive consequences for the actor's own well-being (Baumeister & Scher, 1988), but more usually the term refers to the consequences of a behavior for others (see Peeters & Czapinski, 1990, and Vonk, 1999b, on the distinction between self-profitable and other-profitable behaviors). From the observer's perspective, self-presentations classified as positive in the taxonomy above may turn out to be aversive or vice versa. For instance, as noted earlier, playing dumb may be anything but aversive from the viewpoint of the target, because it often serves to protect the target's self-worth. Conversely, self-promotion may be quite aversive when it is not conducted with the appropriate subtlety. Especially in cases like the latter, where positive self-presentations inadvertently become obnoxious, the self-presentation is unlikely to affect the target in the way that was intended and desired by the actor.

In the next section, I address intended negative self-presentations, that is, the negative types of self-presentation in the taxonomy above.

B

Behavi

Interpe

the d

inevit

with c

need c

on the

well-b

difficu

relatio

one wh

leaving

be the s

next da

jerk? Re

with me

well-bei

many, pe

greatest

I describe a correlational study in which the motives for these deliberately negative self-presentations were further explored, by comparing these self-presentations with their intentionally positive counterparts. In that study, self-presentation is examined from the perspective of the self-presenting actor. The subsequent section takes the perspective of the audience and considers unintended aversive self-presentations—that is, self-presentations that are intended to be positive (such as self-promotion and ingratiation), but are in fact perceived by others as aversive. A literature review is presented to address the questions when and why self-presentation becomes disagreeable from the perspective of observers.

INTENDED AVERSIVE SELF-PRESENTATIONS: AN EMPIRICAL EXPLORATION

Six of the eight self-presentations in the taxonomy above were examined in a survey among readers of the Dutch popular journal *Psychologie*, based on the same concept as *Psychology Today*. Among other things, the purpose of this study was to examine the occurrence of negative self-presentational behaviors (i.e., hostility, playing dumb, and supplication), to compare these categories with their positive counterparts (ingratiation, self-promotion, and autonomy), and to explore the motives for negative self-presentations and the settings in which they occur. The morality dimension was not included in the study; the length of the questionnaire required some restrictions and, as noted, the negative pole of this dimension seems infrequent, especially in a sample like this.

Method

In an issue of *Psychologie*, a questionnaire on self-presentation was included. Readers were encouraged to think about the ways in which they present themselves to others and to fill out the questionnaire and mail it in a postage-paid envelope provided for this purpose; they could also respond by e-mail. The questionnaire started with a brief introduction on self-presentation, in which it was explained that any behavior can be the result of the motive to present the self in some way. Six categories of self-presentation (self-promotion, playing dumb, ingratiation, hostility, autonomy, and supplication, in this order) were briefly described. For each category, a list of behaviors associated with that category was presented (e.g., for self-promotion: emphasize one's abilities, describe one's accomplishments, claim personal responsibility for a joint performance, attribute bad performance to lack of effort or situational variables, show off knowledge, use difficult language, drop names). No examples were given regarding settings or motives, because these might influence respondents. It was stressed

I describe a correlational study in which the motives for these deliberately negative self-presentations were further explored, by comparing these self-presentations with their intentionally positive counterparts. In that study, self-presentation is examined from the perspective of the self-presenting actor. The subsequent section takes the perspective of the audience and considers unintended aversive self-presentations—that is, self-presentations that are intended to be positive (such as self-promotion and ingratiation), but are in fact perceived by others as aversive. A literature review is presented to address the questions when and why self-presentation becomes disagreeable from the perspective of observers.

INTENDED AVERSIVE SELF-PRESENTATIONS: AN EMPIRICAL EXPLORATION

Six of the eight self-presentations in the taxonomy above were examined in a survey among readers of the Dutch popular journal *Psychologie*, based on the same concept as *Psychology Today*. Among other things, the purpose of this study was to examine the occurrence of negative self-presentational behaviors (i.e., hostility, playing dumb, and supplication), to compare these categories with their positive counterparts (ingratiation, self-promotion, and autonomy), and to explore the motives for negative self-presentations and the settings in which they occur. The morality dimension was not included in the study; the length of the questionnaire required some restrictions and, as noted, the negative pole of this dimension seems infrequent, especially in a sample like this.

Method

In an issue of *Psychologie*, a questionnaire on self-presentation was included. Readers were encouraged to think about the ways in which they present themselves to others and to fill out the questionnaire and mail it in a postage-paid envelope provided for this purpose; they could also respond by e-mail. The questionnaire started with a brief introduction on self-presentation, in which it was explained that any behavior can be the result of the motive to present the self in some way. Six categories of self-presentation (self-promotion, playing dumb, ingratiation, hostility, autonomy, and supplication, in this order) were briefly described. For each category, a list of behaviors associated with that category was presented (e.g., for self-promotion: emphasize one's abilities, describe one's accomplishments, claim personal responsibility for a joint performance, attribute bad performance to lack of effort or situational variables, show off knowledge, use difficult language, drop names). No examples were given regarding settings or motives, because these might influence respondents. It was stressed

that a behavior is self-presentational only when it is motivated by the goal to affect others' impression of the self, that is, to be seen as competent or knowledgeable, as incompetent or ignorant, as likable, as hostile or threatening, as autonomous and independent, or as helpless and dependent. It was also noted that self-presentation does not necessarily imply deceit. For instance, one may compliment a person and really mean it, but the act of complimenting may be motivated by self-presentational goals. So, self-presentation can range from making genuine compliments, vis exaggerating it a little, to blatant deceit, as long as the motive is to affect someone's impression of oneself rather than simply to express one's feelings.

For each of the six categories of self-presentation, respondents were asked to indicate how frequently they engaged in this type of self-presentation on a scale ranging from 1 (*never*) to 5 (*almost all the time*). If their response was *never*, they were routed to the next set of questions; in the other cases, they were asked to think of the most recent occasion on which they had engaged in this behavior and to describe briefly in their own words (a) the persons toward whom the behavior was enacted, (b) their intention or goal, and (c) their exact behavior.

Responses to these questions were coded by two judges. Part of the material (124 descriptions) was coded independently by both judges to examine interjudge agreement. From the descriptions of motives and behavior, the judges identified instances that did not fit the criteria of self-presentation (mostly because the behavior did not serve self-presentational goals, e.g., asking for help with a chore because one wants to be helped) or did not belong in that particular category. The persons toward whom the behavior was enacted were classified into one of 47 categories (e.g., neighbor, spouse, sibling, teacher, physician, waiter or waitress), which are described later (interjudge agreement = 92%). The motives listed by the respondents were coded on a scale from 1 (entirely self-serving) to 7 (entirely other-serving; between-judges r = .83). An example of a motive coded as 1 is the motive to get a job; an example of a motive coded as 7 is the motive to cheer up a friend who feels bad.

The last part of the questionnaire consisted of a Dutch adaptation of Snyder's (1974) self-monitoring scale,[2] followed by three background questions (regarding sex, age, and education).

A completed questionnaire was returned by 447 readers (116 male respondents and 321 female respondents; 10 respondents did not indicate their gender), with a mean age of 34.1 years (age range 14–82) and with mostly higher education (226 respondents had completed higher professional education or had a master's degree). These data indicate that the sample was a fair reflection of the demographics of *Psychologie* readers.

[2]The results of this assessment are beyond the scope of this chapter. Self-monitoring was significantly correlated with the frequency of all self-presentations (most strongly with ingratiation, r = .38, and self-promotion, r = .30) except for hostility.

BEH
B

Behaving Ba
Interpersonal
the dark si
inevitable
with other
need othe
on them f
well-being
difficult t
relationsh
one who r
leaving flo
be the sar
next day a
jerk? Rela
with mea
well-beins
many, per
greatest f

Results

Occurrence

In reporting the results of the study, I describe both the three negative and the three positive self-presentations examined here. The purpose is to examine the motives and the situations that evoke negative self-presentations, so the data on the positive self-presentations are reported primarily for the sake of comparison.

Table 4.2 presents the occurrence of each of the six types of self-presentation, according to respondents' own frequency ratings. On all three dimensions, the negative category was enacted significantly less frequently than the positive one. This is hardly remarkable, considering that self-presentation typically implies that a desirable image of the self is presented. What is remarkable in these results is that the negative varieties of self-presentation are not uncommon at all, according to respondents' own indications. For hostility and playing dumb, the mean frequency is close to 3, which was the *sometimes* category on the response scale. Only supplication seems to occur less frequently, with a mean closer to *rarely*. This was the only category for which the ratings of male (M = 1.95) and female respondents (M = 2.24) were significantly different.

Table 4.3 presents the correlations between the reported frequencies of the different categories of self-presentation. Note that there are only minor negative correlations between the two poles of each dimension, that is, ingratiation–hostility, self-promotion–playing dumb, and autonomy–supplication. The two poles seem to be largely independent from each other. Overall, negative self-presentations are not inversely related to positive ones. On the contrary, several of the positive and negative self-presentations are positively correlated with each other. Ingratiation has positive correlations with all other self-presentations except for its opposite, hostility. These results suggest that, generally, negative self-presentations are enacted by the same people as positive ones.

TABLE 4.2
Frequency of Occurrence of Six Categories of Self-Presentation Behavior

Behavior	*M*	*SD*
Ingratiation	3.74	.93
Hostility–intimidation	2.89	.85
Self-promotion	3.18	.86
Playing dumb	2.93	.90
Autonomy	3.45	.97
Supplication	2.17	.86

Note. Respondents rated their self-presentation behaviors on a 5-point scale (1 = *never*, 5 = *almost all the time*).

Results

Occurrence

In reporting the results of the study, I describe both the three negative and the three positive self-presentations examined here. The purpose is to examine the motives and the situations that evoke negative self-presentations, so the data on the positive self-presentations are reported primarily for the sake of comparison.

Table 4.2 presents the occurrence of each of the six types of self-presentation, according to respondents' own frequency ratings. On all three dimensions, the negative category was enacted significantly less frequently than the positive one. This is hardly remarkable, considering that self-presentation typically implies that a desirable image of the self is presented. What is remarkable in these results is that the negative varieties of self-presentation are not uncommon at all, according to respondents' own indications. For hostility and playing dumb, the mean frequency is close to 3, which was the *sometimes* category on the response scale. Only supplication seems to occur less frequently, with a mean closer to *rarely*. This was the only category for which the ratings of male (M = 1.95) and female respondents (M = 2.24) were significantly different.

Table 4.3 presents the correlations between the reported frequencies of the different categories of self-presentation. Note that there are only minor negative correlations between the two poles of each dimension, that is, ingratiation–hostility, self-promotion–playing dumb, and autonomy–supplication. The two poles seem to be largely independent from each other. Overall, negative self-presentations are not inversely related to positive ones. On the contrary, several of the positive and negative self-presentations are positively correlated with each other. Ingratiation has positive correlations with all other self-presentations except for its opposite, hostility. These results suggest that, generally, negative self-presentations are enacted by the same people as positive ones.

TABLE 4.2
Frequency of Occurrence of Six Categories of Self-Presentation Behavior

Behavior	*M*	*SD*
Ingratiation	3.74	.93
Hostility–intimidation	2.89	.85
Self-promotion	3.18	.86
Playing dumb	2.93	.90
Autonomy	3.45	.97
Supplication	2.17	.86

Note. Respondents rated their self-presentation behaviors on a 5-point scale (1 = *never*, 5 = *almost all the time*).

TABLE 4.3
Pearson Correlations Between Reported Frequency of Enacting the Different Types of Self-Presentation Behaviors

Behavior	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.
1. Ingratiation						
2. Hostility	−.10*					
3. Self-promotion	.30***	.08				
4. Playing dumb	.14**	.08	−.07			
5. Autonomy	.22***	.19***	.26***	.02		
6. Supplication	.24***	.09	.02	.14**	−.08	

Note. *$p < .05$. **$p < .01$. ***$p < .001$.

Note that the negative self-presentations under consideration here are intentional. Respondents were explicitly asked to report behaviors by which they knowingly set out to convey an unlikable, ignorant, or dependent impression. Having established that these intentional aversive self-presentations are not unusual, the next question is what motivates people to project undesirable images like these and in which social settings this behavior occurs.

Motives

Respondents were asked to think of the last time they engaged in each of the six self-presentation behaviors and to describe their motives for the behavior. Not surprisingly, these motives were highly divergent across the six categories. Each type of self-presentation appears to be driven by its own set of motives. The motives were classified on a self-serving versus other-serving dimension to allow some analysis at an aggregate level (see Method description above). Table 4.4 presents the results of this classification in the first column. The second column reports the number of descriptions on which the analyses in the present section are based (i.e.,

TABLE 4.4
Mean Ratings for Motive Given for the Most Recent Instance of Each Type of Self-Presentation Behavior

Behavior	Motive	Valid *N*
Ingratiation	2.75_a	350
Hostility	1.39_b	301
Self-promotion	1.35_b	284
Playing dumb	3.32_c	267
Autonomy	1.75_d	230
Supplication	1.16_b	153

Note. Motives were rated using a 7-point scale (1 = *self-serving*, 7 = *other-serving*). Means that do not share the same subscripts are significantly different at $p < .05$ (Duncan comparison test).

BE

Behaving
Interperso
the dark
inevitabl
with oth
need oth
on them
well-bein
difficult
relationsh
one who
leaving fl
be the san
next day a
jerk? Relat
with mean
well-being
many, perh
greatest fr

after excluding instances that either did not fit the present definition of self-presentation or did not fit the pertinent category; see the description in the Method section).

Overall, the behaviors were predominantly self-serving: All means are below 4, the neutral point of the rating scale. However, analysis of variance indicated that the different types of self-presentation differed from each other in this respect, $F(5, 1{,}585) = 85.14$, $p < .001$.[3] The most extreme self-serving category is *supplication*. The motives listed for this behavior almost invariably reflected the need to receive help or support, either materially (e.g., help with a flat tire or a clogged sink), but very often emotionally (e.g., pity, comfort, usually "attention"). To list a few examples of this category: A respondent acted "hysterically" because she wanted her mother to help her find something; another one cried and screamed to make her husband "see that I have feelings too"; a husband, in turn, acted "disappointed and depressed" to get his wife to endorse his plans; a woman attempted to make an ex-lover come back by appealing to his guilt; several high school students reported exaggerating their illness because they wanted to stay home from school; and one woman went to her physician deliberately not wearing any make-up and looking dreadful with the goal of getting him to take her illness seriously. Very rarely did supplication serve the target's interest. One of the few exceptions was a therapist who acted helplessly toward a patient to encourage him to describe his situation more clearly.

A shared second place for self-servingness can be assigned to self-promotion and hostility. Self-promotion, not surprisingly, was most frequently used to make a good impression in performance-related settings, for instance, to impress one's superior, to get a job, to be selected for a sports team, to launch an account from a client, to prove that one is worthy of a new position, or to persuade colleagues to go along with one's plans. Some respondents engaged in self-promotion to hide insecurity or simply to evoke appreciation, respect, or admiration or to be taken seriously. Occasionally, it was used in response to others who seemed too content with themselves to put them in their proper place. One respondent acted overly confident toward a car salesman to discourage him from trying to "con" her. Self-promotion rarely served the target's benefit. The exceptions were work-related settings in which respondents attempted to reassure a target who depended on their abilities (e.g., a lawyer toward a distressed client).

Regarding hostility, it should be noted that two subcategories emerged

[3]In the analyses reported here, the six self-presentation categories were treated as between-subjects variables, because a multivariate analysis (with categories as a within-subjects variable) would include only respondents who provided an example of each of the six categories, and the others would be treated as missing cases. Note that the present analyses are conservative because the within-subjects variance is part of the error term. All results were checked by means of the appropriate multivariate tests, and no meaningful differences between the two types of analyses were found.

after excluding instances that either did not fit the present definition of self-presentation or did not fit the pertinent category; see the description in the Method section).

Overall, the behaviors were predominantly self-serving: All means are below 4, the neutral point of the rating scale. However, analysis of variance indicated that the different types of self-presentation differed from each other in this respect, $F(5, 1{,}585) = 85.14$, $p < .001$.[3] The most extreme self-serving category is *supplication*. The motives listed for this behavior almost invariably reflected the need to receive help or support, either materially (e.g., help with a flat tire or a clogged sink), but very often emotionally (e.g., pity, comfort, usually "attention"). To list a few examples of this category: A respondent acted "hysterically" because she wanted her mother to help her find something; another one cried and screamed to make her husband "see that I have feelings too"; a husband, in turn, acted "disappointed and depressed" to get his wife to endorse his plans; a woman attempted to make an ex-lover come back by appealing to his guilt; several high school students reported exaggerating their illness because they wanted to stay home from school; and one woman went to her physician deliberately not wearing any make-up and looking dreadful with the goal of getting him to take her illness seriously. Very rarely did supplication serve the target's interest. One of the few exceptions was a therapist who acted helplessly toward a patient to encourage him to describe his situation more clearly.

A shared second place for self-servingness can be assigned to self-promotion and hostility. Self-promotion, not surprisingly, was most frequently used to make a good impression in performance-related settings, for instance, to impress one's superior, to get a job, to be selected for a sports team, to launch an account from a client, to prove that one is worthy of a new position, or to persuade colleagues to go along with one's plans. Some respondents engaged in self-promotion to hide insecurity or simply to evoke appreciation, respect, or admiration or to be taken seriously. Occasionally, it was used in response to others who seemed too content with themselves to put them in their proper place. One respondent acted overly confident toward a car salesman to discourage him from trying to "con" her. Self-promotion rarely served the target's benefit. The exceptions were work-related settings in which respondents attempted to reassure a target who depended on their abilities (e.g., a lawyer toward a distressed client).

Regarding hostility, it should be noted that two subcategories emerged

[3]In the analyses reported here, the six self-presentation categories were treated as between-subjects variables, because a multivariate analysis (with categories as a within-subjects variable) would include only respondents who provided an example of each of the six categories, and the others would be treated as missing cases. Note that the present analyses are conservative because the within-subjects variance is part of the error term. All results were checked by means of the appropriate multivariate tests, and no meaningful differences between the two types of analyses were found.

from the responses in this category. One type of response clearly reflected intimidation. Here, the goal was to gain or retain control over someone by being strict and unyielding (e.g., toward pupils in the classroom or toward one's own children). More frequently, however, the emphasis was on keeping people at a distance (physically or emotionally), either by deliberately acting in a disinterested manner (e.g., ignore, give brief responses) or by being hostile and aggressive. This type of behavior was reported, for instance, in trying to discourage someone who was sexually or romantically interested in the respondent, to keep pushy strangers at arms length in bars or at parties, to avoid intimacy or sex within a relationship, to signal to a shopkeeper that one only wants to browse, or to simply give somebody the message that one is not interested in further contact. Several respondents reported being conspicuously hostile to show someone that their feelings had been hurt. Others, who had also been hurt, reported being aloof and cold, to act as though they were invulnerable. Most frequently, respondents in this subcategory aimed to create an emotional distance because they wanted to be "left alone"; to shut out others from their emotional lives, especially in difficult times; and to keep their problems private and far away from meddling family members. Sometimes, respondents acted aloof and businesslike to avoid being drawn into someone else's problems or to prevent an emotional outburst during a bad-news conversation. Whenever this type of behavior served other people's interest, it was because respondents felt they should not burden others with their emotional distress or wanted to avoid being the cause of others' concern; therefore, they walled off the other person.

The motives listed for autonomy, another primarily self-serving type of presentation, are partially similar to those for the emotional–hostility category described above: In some cases, respondents used this self-presentational style to keep others from interfering in their lives or, in case of other-serving autonomy, to keep others from worrying about them (e.g., after a divorce when they were living alone) or feeling obligated to help them. A few respondents mentioned autonomous self-presentations toward a former lover or spouse, to demonstrate that they did not need him or her anymore. For several respondents, the goal of autonomous self-presentations was to avoid being seen as weak or vulnerable or to avoid pity by emphasizing their strength and their ability to deal with their problems. Occasionally, respondents mentioned expressing unorthodox or "different" opinions to demonstrate their independent thinking or to show that they did not care to belong in a particular group. One respondent mentioned "playing hard to get" with a person in whom she was romantically interested. Similarly, autonomy was sometimes described as a way to achieve power over someone by acting as if one does not need anything from this person. As I demonstrate later in *Targets*, autonomy also occurred frequently in interactions with parents, especially among younger respon-

BEH
B

Behaving Bac

Interpersonal

the dark sic

inevitable p

with others

need other

on them fo

well-being

difficult to

relationsh

one who r

leaving flo

be the sar

next day a

jerk? Rela

with mea

well-bein

many, pe

greatest f

dents, either because they wanted their parents not to worry about them (e.g., when they had just started living on their own) or when they were still living at home because they wanted to demonstrate their independence and maturity (sometimes with an ulterior goal, e.g., to be left at home alone during their parents' vacation). For similar reasons, respondents sometimes presented themselves as autonomous at work to acquire more independence and responsibilities.

One of the self-presentations that was less self-serving was ingratiation. This might come as a surprise, because ingratiation is the prototypical behavioral instrument to affect others (and has been described as such by E. E. Jones, 1964) and being seen as likable clearly is personally rewarding. Indeed, in many cases respondents ingratiated themselves for this reason, sometimes with specific goals in mind (e.g., to sell something, to persuade someone to have sex with them, to make a new friend; in E. E. Jones's terminology, these are instances of *acquisitive ingratiation*) but usually simply to "be liked" or to "be accepted" (*signifying ingratiation*; E. E. Jones, 1964). Nevertheless, ingratiation was also frequently used to smooth social interaction, for instance, to make everyone feel comfortable at social gatherings, to re-establish peace after a conflict, to improve the atmosphere after a sad event, to establish a friendly relationship with a new colleague, or to avoid an awkward situation (e.g., responding to a waiter that dinner was good even when it was horrible). In cases like these, the judges coded the motive as both self- and other-serving (i.e., a neutral rating of 4). In a minority of cases, ingratiation served mainly the interests of the target, for instance, putting a job applicant at ease, complimenting others to enhance their confidence, or hiding one's boredom and annoyance in response to a friend's monologue about his problems.

The most other-serving self-presentation by far was playing dumb. Some of the motives for this behavior that emerged out of the questionnaires were already mentioned previously; on the self-serving side, for instance, preventing others from asking for help with a chore; on the other-serving side, preventing threats to others' self-esteem. The responses indicated that playing dumb may serve a wide variety of additional purposes. Among other things, respondents mentioned downgrading their abilities to evoke a compliment, concealing their knowledge merely to find out what someone else knows about something, trying to belong in a group that is "less educated" or reducing the distance between them and others, making a good impression with one's new parents-in-law by pretending not to know anything about drugs, making a modest impression or avoiding drawing attention to themselves, reducing high expectations to prevent others from being disappointed or by setting a lower standard for their performance, avoiding an argument or a confrontation by hiding knowledge that contradicts someone's statements, preventing competitiveness or envy, assuring that others do not feel inferior, giving credit to others for a

dents, either because they wanted their parents not to worry about them (e.g., when they had just started living on their own) or when they were still living at home because they wanted to demonstrate their independence and maturity (sometimes with an ulterior goal, e.g., to be left at home alone during their parents' vacation). For similar reasons, respondents sometimes presented themselves as autonomous at work to acquire more independence and responsibilities.

One of the self-presentations that was less self-serving was ingratiation. This might come as a surprise, because ingratiation is the prototypical behavioral instrument to affect others (and has been described as such by E. E. Jones, 1964) and being seen as likable clearly is personally rewarding. Indeed, in many cases respondents ingratiated themselves for this reason, sometimes with specific goals in mind (e.g., to sell something, to persuade someone to have sex with them, to make a new friend; in E. E. Jones's terminology, these are instances of *acquisitive ingratiation*) but usually simply to "be liked" or to "be accepted" (*signifying ingratiation*; E. E. Jones, 1964). Nevertheless, ingratiation was also frequently used to smooth social interaction, for instance, to make everyone feel comfortable at social gatherings, to re-establish peace after a conflict, to improve the atmosphere after a sad event, to establish a friendly relationship with a new colleague, or to avoid an awkward situation (e.g., responding to a waiter that dinner was good even when it was horrible). In cases like these, the judges coded the motive as both self- and other-serving (i.e., a neutral rating of 4). In a minority of cases, ingratiation served mainly the interests of the target, for instance, putting a job applicant at ease, complimenting others to enhance their confidence, or hiding one's boredom and annoyance in response to a friend's monologue about his problems.

The most other-serving self-presentation by far was playing dumb. Some of the motives for this behavior that emerged out of the questionnaires were already mentioned previously; on the self-serving side, for instance, preventing others from asking for help with a chore; on the other-serving side, preventing threats to others' self-esteem. The responses indicated that playing dumb may serve a wide variety of additional purposes. Among other things, respondents mentioned downgrading their abilities to evoke a compliment, concealing their knowledge merely to find out what someone else knows about something, trying to belong in a group that is "less educated" or reducing the distance between them and others, making a good impression with one's new parents-in-law by pretending not to know anything about drugs, making a modest impression or avoiding drawing attention to themselves, reducing high expectations to prevent others from being disappointed or by setting a lower standard for their performance, avoiding an argument or a confrontation by hiding knowledge that contradicts someone's statements, preventing competitiveness or envy, assuring that others do not feel inferior, giving credit to others for a joint accomplishment, and allowing others (mostly one's children or pupils) to discover things for themselves. As can be seen from these examples, especially the last ones, playing dumb may often reduce tension, insecurity, competitiveness, and other social discomfort. In that respect, it is actually the least aversive type of self-presentation of them all.

But overall, as noted, the self-presentations examined in this study were more personally rewarding for the self-presenter than for the target (cf. DePaulo & Kashy, 1998, for parallel findings on lies). Interestingly, there appears to be no systematic difference in this respect between the positive and the negative self-presentations. Corroborating E. E. Jones's (1964, 1990) view, it seems that both positive and negative self-presentations can affect others' behaviors and feelings in desired ways, depending on the setting and on what is desired in that setting.

Targets

In addition to respondents' goals, I also examined toward whom the self-presentations were enacted. Table 4.5 presents the frequencies of targets classified by their role in the respondent's life. Some of the 47 categories used for this classification are not in this table because they occurred infrequently (e.g., waiter, civil servant, and real estate agent). Other categories that occurred infrequently were merged because they are similar and produced a similar pattern of results (e.g., subordinate + job applicant; a friend + best friend; siblings + other family members). Altogether, the target categories listed in this table compose 90% of the material. The entries in the table are frequencies and row percentages, for example, out of all 34 instances in which object of desire or romance was mentioned as the target of self-presentation, 62% were instances of ingratiation.

The row marginals include the proportion of occasions at which self-presentations were directed at each target category. For instance, subordinates + job applicants (0.9%) as well as children (0.6%) were infrequently the targets of self-presentation. (Note that these role labels refer to a target's role with regard to the respondent; e.g., *subordinate* refers to the *respondent's* subordinate.) This corroborates E. E. Jones's (1964, 1990) view that self-presentation is motivated by dependence, that is, the need to influence the target's behavior. Because of the asymmetry in the dependence relationship between supervisors and subordinates, selection officers and job applicants, and parents and children, it follows that self-presentation is more often directed upward (i.e., toward superiors and parents) than downward (i.e., toward subordinates and children), as the results indeed indicate. As can be seen from the row marginals, the most common targets of self-presentation are *colleagues* and *partner or spouse*. In part, this may reflect dependence in these relationships, but we should also realize that people spend a lot of time with their colleagues and their partner, so the base rate for these targets is high to begin with.

TABLE 4.5
Frequencies and Row Percentages for Targets Toward Whom the Six Categories of Self-Presentational Behaviors Were Enacted

Target of Behavior	Ingratiat.	Hostil./ Intim.	Self-Prom.	Play Dumb	Auton.	Suppl.	Total
Object of desire or romance							
n	21	5/1	3	4	1	0	34
%	62	15	9	12	3	—	2
Subordinate or job applicant							
n	8	7/3	0	0	0	0	15
%	53	47	—	—	—	—	<1
Pupil or student							
n	9	8/8	5	3	1	1	27
%	33	30	19	11	4	4	2
Children							
n	1	4/4	0	2	1	1	9
%	11	44	—	22	11	11	<1
Stranger							
n	13	21/4	5	3	2	1	45
%	29	47	11	7	4	2	3
Ex-partner or ex-spouse							
n	0	5/1	0	1	4	2	12
%	—	42	—	8	33	17	<1
Neighbors or roommates							
n	11	16/0	2	3	4	3	39
%	28	41	5	8	10	8	3
In-laws							
n	13	8/1	1	6	4	1	33
%	39	24	3	18	12	3	2
Job interviewer or future superior							
n	6	0/0	39	1	4	0	50
%	12	—	78	2	8	—	3

TABLE 4.5
Frequencies and Row Percentages for Targets Toward Whom the Six Categories of Self-Presentational Behaviors Were Enacted

Target of Behavior	Ingratiat.	Hostil./ Intim.	Self- Prom.	Play Dumb	Auton.	Suppl.	Total
Object of desire or romance							
n	21	5/1	3	4	1	0	34
%	62	15	9	12	3	—	2
Subordinate or job applicant							
n	8	7/3	0	0	0	0	15
%	53	47	—	—	—	—	<1
Pupil or student							
n	9	8/8	5	3	1	1	27
%	33	30	19	11	4	4	2
Children							
n	1	4/4	0	2	1	1	9
%	11	44	—	22	11	11	<1
Stranger							
n	13	21/4	5	3	2	1	45
%	29	47	11	7	4	2	3
Ex-partner or ex-spouse							
n	0	5/1	0	1	4	2	12
%	—	42	—	8	33	17	<1
Neighbors or roommates							
n	11	16/0	2	3	4	3	39
%	28	41	5	8	10	8	3
In-laws							
n	13	8/1	1	6	4	1	33
%	39	24	3	18	12	3	2
Job interviewer or future superior							
n	6	0/0	39	1	4	0	50
%	12	—	78	2	8	—	3
Teacher or trainer							
n	1	2/0	18	4	4	3	32
%	3	6	56	13	13	9	2
Superior or client							
n	9	6/1	50	14	15	6	100
%	9	6	50	14	15	6	6
(Best) friend							
n	41	24/0	20	54	26	12	177
%	23	14	18	31	15	7	11
Parents							
n	9	12/1	2	3	45	10	81
%	11	15	3	4	56	12	5
Partner or spouse							
n	35	26/5	12	25	40	76	214
%	16	12	6	12	19	36	14
Physician or therapist							
n	4	0/0	1	2	1	7	15
%	27	0	7	13	7	47	<1
Colleagues							
n	66	62/4	53	55	30	9	275
%	24	23	19	20	11	3	17
Acquaintances							
n	26	25/2	8	27	11	1	98
%	27	26	8	28	11	1	6
Family members							
n	11	15/1	6	18	23	15	88
%	13	17	7	21	26	17	6
Fellow students or class mates							
n	18	14/0	19	21	3	1	76
%	24	18	25	28	4	1	5

Note. Ingratiat. = ingratiation; hostil./intim. = hostility/frequency of intimidation among hostile behaviors; self-prom. = self-promotion; auton. = autonomy; suppl. = supplication. Targets are ordered by the type of self-presentation that is predominant for this target category; percentages for predominant self-presentations are underlined. All percentages have been rounded.

The table rows are ordered by the predominance of a self-presentational category, starting with *ingratiation*, which is predominant for *object of desire–romance* and for *subordinate + job applicant*. The percentages for these predominant self-presentations are underscored. The last four rows (*colleagues*, *acquaintances*, *family members*, and *class mates*) represent target categories for which no type of self-presentation stood out.

As noted earlier, the *hostility* category consisted of two subcategories, labeled *intimidation* and *distance* hereafter. Because the two are associated with different target categories, the entries in the hostility column all have a sword entry, indicating the number of occurrences of intimidation (interjudge agreement for this distinction was 77%). Thus, for instance, out of the total of seven instances of hostile self-presentations toward subordinates or job applicants, three were instances of intimidation. For behaviors toward children (enacted by parents) and pupils (enacted by teachers), all were instances of intimidation. These results illustrate that intimidation is typically a style of self-presentation used by the more powerful to maintain or regain control. In the other target categories characterized by high proportions of hostile self-presentations, these are mostly of the distance type. Relatively often, respondents were intentionally hostile or cold toward strangers, ex-lovers, neighbors, and in-laws to create or maintain a distance (although in the case of in-laws, many other respondents did attempt to be friendly by means of ingratiation).

Quite sensibly, *self-promotion* was the primary self-presentation in the interaction with job interviewers, (future) superiors, and teachers or trainers. The negative counterpart, *playing dumb*, was used frequently toward (best) friends. This finding converges with results reported by Tice, Butler, Muraven, and Stillwell (1995), who suggested that modesty prevails in the interaction with friends because they are already familiar with one's abilities. In these cases, when their talents are already recognized, people are able to avoid the risk of being seen as arrogant. This does not necessarily explain why people would play dumb instead. It is possible that some of the motives for this self-presentation are especially relevant in the interaction with friends, in particular motives that are related to avoiding competitiveness, envy, and feelings of inferiority on the part of the target, because equality is generally seen as essential to friendships.

Autonomy was the dominant self-presentation toward parents, both for children and adult respondents (note that the youngest respondent was 14). Its negative counterpart, *supplication*, occurred primarily in the interaction with partner or spouse and physician or therapist. As noted earlier, male and female respondents differed in the estimated frequency of this particular category. The reason may be that men tended to restrict supplication to the interaction with their intimate partner, whereas women used it in other settings as well. At least two variables may contribute to these differences. First, dependent and helpless behavior is part of the negative

The table rows are ordered by the predominance of a self-presentational category, starting with *ingratiation*, which is predominant for *object of desire–romance* and for *subordinate + job applicant*. The percentages for these predominant self-presentations are underscored. The last four rows (*colleagues*, *acquaintances*, *family members*, and *class mates*) represent target categories for which no type of self-presentation stood out.

As noted earlier, the *hostility* category consisted of two subcategories, labeled *intimidation* and *distance* hereafter. Because the two are associated with different target categories, the entries in the hostility column all have a sword entry, indicating the number of occurrences of intimidation (interjudge agreement for this distinction was 77%). Thus, for instance, out of the total of seven instances of hostile self-presentations toward subordinates or job applicants, three were instances of intimidation. For behaviors toward children (enacted by parents) and pupils (enacted by teachers), all were instances of intimidation. These results illustrate that intimidation is typically a style of self-presentation used by the more powerful to maintain or regain control. In the other target categories characterized by high proportions of hostile self-presentations, these are mostly of the distance type. Relatively often, respondents were intentionally hostile or cold toward strangers, ex-lovers, neighbors, and in-laws to create or maintain a distance (although in the case of in-laws, many other respondents did attempt to be friendly by means of ingratiation).

Quite sensibly, *self-promotion* was the primary self-presentation in the interaction with job interviewers, (future) superiors, and teachers or trainers. The negative counterpart, *playing dumb*, was used frequently toward (best) friends. This finding converges with results reported by Tice, Butler, Muraven, and Stillwell (1995), who suggested that modesty prevails in the interaction with friends because they are already familiar with one's abilities. In these cases, when their talents are already recognized, people are able to avoid the risk of being seen as arrogant. This does not necessarily explain why people would play dumb instead. It is possible that some of the motives for this self-presentation are especially relevant in the interaction with friends, in particular motives that are related to avoiding competitiveness, envy, and feelings of inferiority on the part of the target, because equality is generally seen as essential to friendships.

Autonomy was the dominant self-presentation toward parents, both for children and adult respondents (note that the youngest respondent was 14). Its negative counterpart, *supplication*, occurred primarily in the interaction with partner or spouse and physician or therapist. As noted earlier, male and female respondents differed in the estimated frequency of this particular category. The reason may be that men tended to restrict supplication to the interaction with their intimate partner, whereas women used it in other settings as well. At least two variables may contribute to these differences. First, dependent and helpless behavior is part of the negative

stereotype of women, so men are probably very cautious with this behavior, especially in public settings. Indeed, in a study among intimate couples, we found that men tend to express feminine qualities only in the interaction with their intimate partner (Vonk & Van Nobelen, 1993). Second, in our society women still do not have the same power that men have, and supplication is a self-presentational ploy typically used by powerless people. It is often the only way to influence a more powerful target. Notwithstanding the rationale of this behavior in some situations, the examples of it presented earlier illustrate its aversiveness. Not only is this behavior aversive to others, it can have undesirable consequences for the actor as well, because negative self-presentations, just as positive ones, may become second nature (E. E. Jones, Rhodewalt, Berglas, & Skelton, 1981; Rhodewalt, 1986).

Summary

The data on the motives and the targets of the different categories of self-presentation show that many divergent motives and settings can evoke negative self-presentations. Of the three categories examined here —or perhaps it would be more appropriate to say four, considering the differences between intimidation and distance—each one appears to be associated with its own set of motives and settings.[4] Overall, people seem to have sensible reasons to engage in negative self-presentations. When they engage in intimidation or create a distance, it is probably true that they do not make themselves likable, but that is usually not their intention in those situations. Similarly, when people present themselves as foolish and ignorant or as helpless and dependent, they are not seen as competent or strong, but they do accomplish other purposes, which presumably are more important to them at that point. Apparently, then, people make trade-offs between the positive and negative consequences of their self-presentations, although it is conceivable that they underestimate the latter (Baumeister & Scher, 1988).

It is noteworthy that the correlations between different self-presentations are generally positive and that even diametrically opposite self-presentations (ingratiation vs. hostility, self-promotion vs. playing dumb, autonomy vs. supplication) are not strongly negatively correlated. It appears that people simply differ from each other in their tendency to engage in self-presentation (with a greater tendency among those high in self-monitoring; see footnote 2) and that, to the extent that an individual uses self-presentation as a behavioral instrument, any type of self-

[4]There are similarities between supplication and playing dumb, but only to the extent that these categories are themselves correlated with each other. That is, foolish or ignorant behavior may often co-occur with helpless behavior; as a consequence, the two categories share some of the same motives and settings.

presentation is more likely to be used, depending on the setting and the individual's motives. Indeed, it is characteristic of the very phenomenon of self-presentation that one's behavior is adapted to the situation at hand. Negative self-presentations may be just as functional as positive ones, depending on the setting, characteristics of the target, and the actor's goals. These goals may be either selfish or altruistic. Importantly, both negative and positive self-presentations may serve either selfish or altruistic motives.

In the study described above, self-presentation was examined from the perspective of the actor. Presumably, respondents who reported occasions where they were trying to make a hostile or stupid or helpless impression aimed to be perceived negatively, at least on the pertinent dimension of judgment, whereas efforts to make a likable or intelligent or autonomous impression reflect the goal of being perceived favorably. What we do not know is whether these goals are actually accomplished, because secondary impressions may deviate from calculated impressions. In some cases, negative self-presentations may have unintended positive effects on the audience; in other cases, positive self-presentations may have unintended negative effects and be perceived as aversive. This latter outcome is likely to occur more frequently, for two reasons. First, the positive effects of negative self-presentations are usually foreseen and even intended (e.g., being seen as modest by playing dumb), whereas the negative effects of positive presentations are usually not (e.g., being seen as arrogant by engaging in self-promotion or as self-righteous by engaging in exemplification). Second, all self-presentations, both negative and positive, may arouse unintended aversion among targets as soon as the self-presentation is recognized as such—that is, as soon as suspicion arises regarding the authenticity of the presentation. In the following section, I describe these unintended aversive effects of self-presentation and review the literature that has examined the observer's perspective.

UNINTENDED AVERSIVE SELF-PRESENTATIONS

Authenticity

In society, it is socially desirable to behave consistently with one's true inner thoughts and feelings (e.g., Gergen, 1968; M. R. Leary, 1995; Schlenker, 1980; Vonk, 1999e). People should be authentic; their words should match their deeds. As a consequence, self-presenters are judged negatively when the impressions they convey are perceived to deviate from how they really are. The effects of a discrepancy between one's perceived true self and one's self-presentational behavior are perhaps most clearly illustrated by the phenomenon of hypocrisy, which represents a failed attempt at exemplification (Gilbert & Jones, 1986; cf. Stone, Wiegand,

presentation is more likely to be used, depending on the setting and the individual's motives. Indeed, it is characteristic of the very phenomenon of self-presentation that one's behavior is adapted to the situation at hand. Negative self-presentations may be just as functional as positive ones, depending on the setting, characteristics of the target, and the actor's goals. These goals may be either selfish or altruistic. Importantly, both negative and positive self-presentations may serve either selfish or altruistic motives.

In the study described above, self-presentation was examined from the perspective of the actor. Presumably, respondents who reported occasions where they were trying to make a hostile or stupid or helpless impression aimed to be perceived negatively, at least on the pertinent dimension of judgment, whereas efforts to make a likable or intelligent or autonomous impression reflect the goal of being perceived favorably. What we do not know is whether these goals are actually accomplished, because secondary impressions may deviate from calculated impressions. In some cases, negative self-presentations may have unintended positive effects on the audience; in other cases, positive self-presentations may have unintended negative effects and be perceived as aversive. This latter outcome is likely to occur more frequently, for two reasons. First, the positive effects of negative self-presentations are usually foreseen and even intended (e.g., being seen as modest by playing dumb), whereas the negative effects of positive presentations are usually not (e.g., being seen as arrogant by engaging in self-promotion or as self-righteous by engaging in exemplification). Second, all self-presentations, both negative and positive, may arouse unintended aversion among targets as soon as the self-presentation is recognized as such—that is, as soon as suspicion arises regarding the authenticity of the presentation. In the following section, I describe these unintended aversive effects of self-presentation and review the literature that has examined the observer's perspective.

UNINTENDED AVERSIVE SELF-PRESENTATIONS

Authenticity

In society, it is socially desirable to behave consistently with one's true inner thoughts and feelings (e.g., Gergen, 1968; M. R. Leary, 1995; Schlenker, 1980; Vonk, 1999e). People should be authentic; their words should match their deeds. As a consequence, self-presenters are judged negatively when the impressions they convey are perceived to deviate from how they really are. The effects of a discrepancy between one's perceived true self and one's self-presentational behavior are perhaps most clearly illustrated by the phenomenon of hypocrisy, which represents a failed attempt at exemplification (Gilbert & Jones, 1986; cf. Stone, Wiegand,

Cooper, & Aronson, 1997). It is one thing to lie about one's age or to spend a lot of money on vacations and give none to charity or to neglect recycling one's waste; but it becomes a lot worse if that same person publicly advocates the importance of honesty or charity or protection of the environment. Thus, we may suspect that when people proclaim certain moral or prosocial values and it is found that they themselves do not live up to their own standards, they are judged more negatively than if they had not proclaimed anything at all.

It should be noted that our disapproval of inconsistencies between words and deeds is not entirely sensible. For instance, being a vegetarian, I often receive criticism because I do eat eggs and fish sometimes and wear leather shoes. When people catch me doing things like this, which are inconsistent with my own principles, they sometimes get upset or smug with me. They may even think that I am a hypocrite. Nevertheless, I think I can make a pretty good case that I am doing a better job at contributing to protect animal welfare and end Third World starvation than those who are consistent meat eaters. Granted, it would be even better if I dropped the eggs, fish, and leather, but surely it is worse to do nothing at all. Similarly, we would probably prefer parents who smoke and warn their children about the hazards of smoking rather than parents who smoke and omit this warning. It would be better, of course, if they quit smoking, but it would be worse to make their words consistent with their behavior. Thus, it may be argued that the high value we place on consistency and authenticity is not always rational.

Moreover, considering the many social benefits of self-presentation described at the beginning of this chapter, one may wonder why authenticity and consistency are so highly valued and why adapting to situational demands is seen as undesirable.[5] One possibility is that, from the perspective of the observer, cross-situational consistency is quite functional: Forming impressions of others allows people to predict future behavior, and it provides them with a sense of control (e.g., Miller, Norman, & Wright, 1978; cf. Vonk, 1999c). If those others change like chameleons in each setting, they become unpredictable. So, if people remain true to their inner selves, we can rely on them to engage in the same sort of behavior across different occasions and to act in accordance with the views they have expressed on previous occasions. This enhances our sense of control and predictability.

In addition, it is conceivable that natural selection has made humans

[5]Evidence for this undesirability comes from studies on correspondence bias, in which participants read about a person's behavior and learn that the behavior was conducted either under situational pressure or by the actor's free choice. In these studies, one often obtains a main effect of the choice manipulation, such that the actor is liked less when the behavior matches situational constraints (e.g., Vonk, 1999c).

overly sensitive about duplicity. The human species spent 99% of its evolutionary history in a hunter–gatherer mode, characterized by social exchange among group members (Axelrod, 1984). In this setting, survival depends in part on the ability to detect cheaters, such as people who claim to invest in the commodities of the group whereas in fact they only take from it (Cosmides, 1989; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). As a consequence, members whose behavior does not match their presentations may be judged harshly.

Based on the considerations above, it may be assumed that any kind of self-presentation, whatever its position in the taxonomy used here, is judged negatively when it is perceived as deviating from the actor's true feelings or intentions. This implies that the mere occurrence of self-presentation can be seen as aversive, regardless of its valence, when the actor is suspected of not being genuine. Converging with this assumption, a study by Schlenker and Leary (1982) demonstrated that actors are judged negatively when claims about their performance do not match their actual abilities; this effect occurs regardless of whether they claim to be better (self-promotion) or worse than is warranted (playing dumb). A recent study (Vonk, 1999e) suggested that the reduced likability of self-glorifying and self-deprecating actors is mediated by the inference that the actor's ability claims are driven by self-presentational motives rather than the motive to provide accurate information about the self. Specifically, actors claiming high ability are disliked more to the extent that their statements are assumed to reflect the need to boast or impress others; actors claiming low ability are disliked more to the extent that they are suspected of false modesty or preemptively setting up a defense against future public failure.

Thus, it can be argued that the mere occurrence of self-presentation is seen as aversive, or at least as socially undesirable, because it implies that observers do not always see what they may eventually get. However, given this negative base rate for the occurrence of self-presentation in general, some forms of self-presentation are more aversive than others. For one thing, it is worse to be duped on the positive than on the negative side: If a person's true self turns out to be worse (less likable or competent) than we have been led to believe, the discrepancy is more severe than if the person turns out to be better than the self-presentation suggested. In the latter case, the potential damage is smaller (cf. Vonk, 1999c). Therefore, self-presentations classified as positive in the taxonomy above are particularly likely to be perceived as aversive by observers.

Empirical demonstrations of observers' perceptions of self-presenting actors are mostly restricted to two positive and widely occurring categories of self-presentation: self-promotion and ingratiation. These studies are described more specifically in the next section.

overly sensitive about duplicity. The human species spent 99% of its evolutionary history in a hunter–gatherer mode, characterized by social exchange among group members (Axelrod, 1984). In this setting, survival depends in part on the ability to detect cheaters, such as people who claim to invest in the commodities of the group whereas in fact they only take from it (Cosmides, 1989; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). As a consequence, members whose behavior does not match their presentations may be judged harshly.

Based on the considerations above, it may be assumed that any kind of self-presentation, whatever its position in the taxonomy used here, is judged negatively when it is perceived as deviating from the actor's true feelings or intentions. This implies that the mere occurrence of self-presentation can be seen as aversive, regardless of its valence, when the actor is suspected of not being genuine. Converging with this assumption, a study by Schlenker and Leary (1982) demonstrated that actors are judged negatively when claims about their performance do not match their actual abilities; this effect occurs regardless of whether they claim to be better (self-promotion) or worse than is warranted (playing dumb). A recent study (Vonk, 1999e) suggested that the reduced likability of self-glorifying and self-deprecating actors is mediated by the inference that the actor's ability claims are driven by self-presentational motives rather than the motive to provide accurate information about the self. Specifically, actors claiming high ability are disliked more to the extent that their statements are assumed to reflect the need to boast or impress others; actors claiming low ability are disliked more to the extent that they are suspected of false modesty or preemptively setting up a defense against future public failure.

Thus, it can be argued that the mere occurrence of self-presentation is seen as aversive, or at least as socially undesirable, because it implies that observers do not always see what they may eventually get. However, given this negative base rate for the occurrence of self-presentation in general, some forms of self-presentation are more aversive than others. For one thing, it is worse to be duped on the positive than on the negative side: If a person's true self turns out to be worse (less likable or competent) than we have been led to believe, the discrepancy is more severe than if the person turns out to be better than the self-presentation suggested. In the latter case, the potential damage is smaller (cf. Vonk, 1999c). Therefore, self-presentations classified as positive in the taxonomy above are particularly likely to be perceived as aversive by observers.

Empirical demonstrations of observers' perceptions of self-presenting actors are mostly restricted to two positive and widely occurring categories of self-presentation: self-promotion and ingratiation. These studies are described more specifically in the next section.

Self-Promotion

In a study by Godfrey, Jones, and Lord (1986), participants interacted with each other. Some were instructed to get the other participant to see them as extremely competent. Ratings by the other participant indicated that (a) only some individuals with this instruction managed to increase their perceived competence, and (b) all participants instructed to self-promote were seen as less likable after the interaction. The authors concluded that "self-promotion is not ingratiating." A recent study by Rudman (1998) showed that this is especially true when the self-promoting actor is a woman, because self-promotion violates the female role prescription of being modest and noncompetitive. In Rudman's experiments, self-promotion was effective in producing increased hireability ratings, but generally it was also associated with decreased likability. Correlational research by Paulhus (1998) suggested that people who habitually engage in self-enhancement may be liked initially but are judged negatively (and highly discrepant from their self-evaluations) after several encounters, presumably because "examples of their self-absorption . . . may eventually have accumulated to an offensive level" (p. 1206).

Looking at the behaviors that were used by self-promoters in the Godfrey et al. study, it makes sense that they were relatively disliked. In a way, the behaviors enacted by self-promoters are the opposite of what people do when they ingratiate themselves. Ingratiators draw out the other person, direct attention to the other person's area of expertise and interest, spend more time listening than talking, express agreement with the other's opinions, and tell self-deprecating anecdotes. Self-promoters do exactly the opposite: They attempt to control the conversation, direct attention to themselves and avoid the other's area of expertise, spend more time talking than listening, express disagreement with the other person, and stress their own accomplishments. Pretty aversive indeed.

Self-promotion, then, is a very hazardous type of self-presentation. If it succeeds, one usually has to incur the cost of being seen as less likable. This may be part of the trade-off, and it may be worth it if being seen as competent is sufficiently important. However, it is conceivable that one does not even accomplish this in some cases, because reduced likability may affect perceived competence (through the halo effect). Especially in the long run, when people remember only their global evaluations of a person and not the exact facts on which their inferences are based, it seems likely that competence ratings are more affected by perceived likability than by specific recollections of a person's accomplishments (cf. Ebbesen, 1981; Lingle, Dukerich, & Ostrom, 1983; Schul & Burnstein, 1985).

Highly similar words of caution can be derived from a related area, the study of self-handicapping. E. E. Jones and Berglas (1978) initially suggested that people may privately protect their self-esteem by seeking

or creating impediments to performance, so that bad performance can be attributed to these impediments rather than low ability (discounting), whereas good performance makes the individual's ability all the more impressive (augmentation). In later research (e.g., T. W. Smith, Snyder, & Handelsman, 1982; T. W. Smith, Snyder, & Perkins, 1983), self-handicapping was examined as a public, self-presentational strategy, whereby people claim or exaggerate impediments to performance. In effect, this type of self-handicapping is a self-promotional tactic, intended to make the actor look more competent.

Like other varieties of self-promotion, self-handicapping appears to be a tricky business. Indeed, the few researchers who have considered self-handicapping behavior from the perspective of the observer have all concluded that the self-presentational utility of the behavior is small (Arkin & Baumgardner, 1985; Luginbuhl & Palmer, 1991; Rhodewalt, Sanbonmatsu, Tschanz, Feick, & Waller, 1995). The effect may be either that the actor is disliked or is not seen as more competent (or both). The most favorable outcome, just as in other cases of effective self-promotion, is that perceived competence is effectively increased whereas likability is reduced (Luginbuhl & Palmer, 1991; D. S. Smith & Strube, 1991). Even in this case, however, the increase in perceived competence appears to be restricted to specific judgments of the task under consideration, rather than overall intelligence or ability (Luginbuhl & Palmer, 1991). In the worst-case scenario, the self-handicapper is seen as relatively incompetent as well as unlikable (Rhodewalt et al., 1995). This result seems most likely when the ability under consideration is relatively ambiguous (e.g., creativity in the Rhodewalt et al. study); in this case, the actor's performance may be assimilated toward the expectation induced by the self-handicapping claims. That is, when a person claims test anxiety or low effort, we do not expect superior performance; as a consequence, the outcome may be perceived as mediocre when there are no clear-cut diagnostic data indicating otherwise.

Self-handicappers apparently cannot overcome these potentially negative effects by means of the type of handicap they use. The disadvantage of claiming external impediments is that it violates the general "norm for internality" (Beauvois & Dubois, 1988; Jellison & Green, 1981), by which people should be responsible for their own behaviors and outcomes. Trying to evade this responsibility by pointing to external factors is socially undesirable and, hence, unlikable. On the other hand, the drawback of claiming internal impediments is that these may affect competence judgments because they are often associated with perceived ability. This appears to be the case even for effort, a variable that logically should have a compensatory relationship to ability in evaluating performance (Heider, 1958). In fact, attributions to ability and effort are positively related, so perceptions of reduced effort are associated with perceptions of reduced ability (e.g.,

or creating impediments to performance, so that bad performance can be attributed to these impediments rather than low ability (discounting), whereas good performance makes the individual's ability all the more impressive (augmentation). In later research (e.g., T. W. Smith, Snyder, & Handelsman, 1982; T. W. Smith, Snyder, & Perkins, 1983), self-handicapping was examined as a public, self-presentational strategy, whereby people claim or exaggerate impediments to performance. In effect, this type of self-handicapping is a self-promotional tactic, intended to make the actor look more competent.

Like other varieties of self-promotion, self-handicapping appears to be a tricky business. Indeed, the few researchers who have considered self-handicapping behavior from the perspective of the observer have all concluded that the self-presentational utility of the behavior is small (Arkin & Baumgardner, 1985; Luginbuhl & Palmer, 1991; Rhodewalt, Sanbonmatsu, Tschanz, Feick, & Waller, 1995). The effect may be either that the actor is disliked or is not seen as more competent (or both). The most favorable outcome, just as in other cases of effective self-promotion, is that perceived competence is effectively increased whereas likability is reduced (Luginbuhl & Palmer, 1991; D. S. Smith & Strube, 1991). Even in this case, however, the increase in perceived competence appears to be restricted to specific judgments of the task under consideration, rather than overall intelligence or ability (Luginbuhl & Palmer, 1991). In the worst-case scenario, the self-handicapper is seen as relatively incompetent as well as unlikable (Rhodewalt et al., 1995). This result seems most likely when the ability under consideration is relatively ambiguous (e.g., creativity in the Rhodewalt et al. study); in this case, the actor's performance may be assimilated toward the expectation induced by the self-handicapping claims. That is, when a person claims test anxiety or low effort, we do not expect superior performance; as a consequence, the outcome may be perceived as mediocre when there are no clear-cut diagnostic data indicating otherwise.

Self-handicappers apparently cannot overcome these potentially negative effects by means of the type of handicap they use. The disadvantage of claiming external impediments is that it violates the general "norm for internality" (Beauvois & Dubois, 1988; Jellison & Green, 1981), by which people should be responsible for their own behaviors and outcomes. Trying to evade this responsibility by pointing to external factors is socially undesirable and, hence, unlikable. On the other hand, the drawback of claiming internal impediments is that these may affect competence judgments because they are often associated with perceived ability. This appears to be the case even for effort, a variable that logically should have a compensatory relationship to ability in evaluating performance (Heider, 1958). In fact, attributions to ability and effort are positively related, so perceptions of reduced effort are associated with perceptions of reduced ability (e.g., Felson & Bohrnstedt, 1980). In addition, because effort is a controllable internal variable (Weiner, 1986), low effort produces decreased liking in comparison with other internal handicaps, such as test anxiety (Rhodewalt et al., 1995). These, in turn, have their own problems. For instance, a person who claims test anxiety may be seen as more likable but certainly not as confident and able to maintain good performance under pressure.

In summary, the extant literature suggests that the effects of self-promotion and self-handicapping are often not what the self-presenter had in mind. At best, the actor is seen as relatively capable with regard to the ability under consideration. In many cases, however, self-promoting and self-handicapping behaviors are mainly perceived as unlikable, and the trade-off with perceived competence is unfavorable because the observer does not even acknowledge the ability claimed or implied by the self-presenter. This seems to be likely when there is no diagnostic, unambiguous information about the actor's accomplishments.

In this context, it is important to note that, in the studies described above, the self-presenters' claims were not corroborated by information about their actual performance. The presence of such information would no doubt make it much easier to convince the audience of one's abilities (Reeder & Fulks, 1980). In most circumstances, it is probably undesirable and "not done" to claim abilities that cannot be verified by the audience. Indeed, self-promotion is more effective when actor and observer are aware that the claims can be publicly tested (Vonk, 1999e). In this case, observers assume that the actor is as capable as he says he is, because he would not want to run the risk of being exposed as pretentious or boastful. As a consequence of this perceived truthfulness, likability is not reduced either.

There appear to be several subtle variables that make self-promoters more credible and likable. Corroboration by actual performance is one of them (or, in the case of self-handicapping, clear evidence of the claimed impediment), but common sense suggests there are many others, such as the extent to which the actor is willing to self-deprecate in other domains (a person who claims high ability in all domains is obviously less credible and less likable) and the setting in which the behavior is enacted (e.g., self-promotion among friends is seen as more undesirable than among strangers; cf. Tice et al., 1995). Everyday life provides self-promoters with many means to soften and cover up their attempts at self-glorification, so things may not be as bad as they appear in laboratory studies. (If they were, self-promotion and self-handicapping would probably have vanished from our behavioral repertoire.) Nevertheless, blatant and embarrassing instances of self-promotion and self-handicapping can be observed regularly, so apparently the fine art of this self-presentational ploy has not been mastered by many of us.

Ingratiation

In the competence domain, a trade-off can be made between likability and competence. Self-glorification may decrease likability, but it may also accomplish that one is seen as capable, and in some settings this is more important than being liked. When it comes to ingratiation, on the other hand, there is only one dimension that matters: likability. As a consequence, self-presentational failures cannot be offset by successes on other dimensions. In this domain, truthfulness is everything. To the extent that there are doubts as to whether one's behavior is genuine, these doubts are immediately reflected on perceived likability (cf. Vonk & Van Knippenberg, 1994).

Two other variables complicate the predicament of the ingratiator. First, whereas claims of high competence can be corroborated by evidence of one's performance, claims of high likability cannot. Anyone can help or support others, donate money to charity, make friendly remarks, and so on, so this type of behavior is far less informative than behaviors reflecting high ability, which can only be enacted by people with at least some level of real competence (Reeder & Brewer, 1979). As a consequence, likable and friendly behaviors contribute little to the impression formed, whereas the slightest indication of unfriendliness may be seen as evidence of a person's true nature (Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987). This implies that, once a negative impression has inadvertently been established, it becomes difficult to turn things around: Even the most sincere and well-intended gesture of friendliness may be interpreted as mere ingratiation or even manipulation. Conversely, a previously established positive impression may be disqualified as soon as a few unlikable behaviors are observed (Vonk, 1993b).

A second complication is referred to as the *ingratiator's dilemma* (E. E. Jones, 1964): Ingratiation is most difficult precisely in those situations where it matters most—namely, when one depends on another person. This is because observers strongly rely on dependence as a cue in determining whether likable behavior is genuine (Vonk, 1998b, Exp. 2). As noted, likable behavior is relatively ambiguous because it can result from a variety of traits and intentions, including the motive to ingratiate or conform to social demands (E. E. Jones & Davis, 1965). Therefore, in determining the meaning of these behaviors, perceivers tend to use cues about the dependence relationship between the actor and the target (Vonk, 1999a).

When likable behaviors are enacted toward a target on whom the actor depends, these behaviors evoke suspicion of ulterior motivation (cf. Fein, 1996; Fein, Hilton, & Miller, 1990). This suspicion is reflected in moderate inferences about the underlying disposition, that is, the actor's true likability level: The observer is uncertain whether the actor is genu-

Ingratiation

In the competence domain, a trade-off can be made between likability and competence. Self-glorification may decrease likability, but it may also accomplish that one is seen as capable, and in some settings this is more important than being liked. When it comes to ingratiation, on the other hand, there is only one dimension that matters: likability. As a consequence, self-presentational failures cannot be offset by successes on other dimensions. In this domain, truthfulness is everything. To the extent that there are doubts as to whether one's behavior is genuine, these doubts are immediately reflected on perceived likability (cf. Vonk & Van Knippenberg, 1994).

Two other variables complicate the predicament of the ingratiator. First, whereas claims of high competence can be corroborated by evidence of one's performance, claims of high likability cannot. Anyone can help or support others, donate money to charity, make friendly remarks, and so on, so this type of behavior is far less informative than behaviors reflecting high ability, which can only be enacted by people with at least some level of real competence (Reeder & Brewer, 1979). As a consequence, likable and friendly behaviors contribute little to the impression formed, whereas the slightest indication of unfriendliness may be seen as evidence of a person's true nature (Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987). This implies that, once a negative impression has inadvertently been established, it becomes difficult to turn things around: Even the most sincere and well-intended gesture of friendliness may be interpreted as mere ingratiation or even manipulation. Conversely, a previously established positive impression may be disqualified as soon as a few unlikable behaviors are observed (Vonk, 1993b).

A second complication is referred to as the *ingratiator's dilemma* (E. E. Jones, 1964): Ingratiation is most difficult precisely in those situations where it matters most—namely, when one depends on another person. This is because observers strongly rely on dependence as a cue in determining whether likable behavior is genuine (Vonk, 1998b, Exp. 2). As noted, likable behavior is relatively ambiguous because it can result from a variety of traits and intentions, including the motive to ingratiate or conform to social demands (E. E. Jones & Davis, 1965). Therefore, in determining the meaning of these behaviors, perceivers tend to use cues about the dependence relationship between the actor and the target (Vonk, 1999a).

When likable behaviors are enacted toward a target on whom the actor depends, these behaviors evoke suspicion of ulterior motivation (cf. Fein, 1996; Fein, Hilton, & Miller, 1990). This suspicion is reflected in moderate inferences about the underlying disposition, that is, the actor's true likability level: The observer is uncertain whether the actor is genuinely likable or is driven by ulterior, self-presentational motives. At this point, the actor's behavior is not yet seen as aversive. The observer is merely considering two competing hypotheses: (a) Either the behavior reflects the actor's true likability, which is good, or (b) it reflects ulterior motives, which is bad. This attributional ambiguity can be resolved by means of additional information about the actor (Fein et al., 1990). For instance, when a person engages in likable behaviors toward more powerful target people (e.g., superiors), it becomes important to know how the person behaves toward less powerful targets (subordinates). In this case, the slightest indication that the person is unlikable toward the latter is sufficient for observers to instantly categorize the person as a detestable "brownoser" (Vonk, 1998b, Exp. 3).

This type of behavioral pattern (referred to in Dutch as "licking upward, kicking downward") is seen as highly aversive in Western culture. It is also a pattern that is recognized relatively easily by observers. People appear to have a readily available "slime schema" (Vonk, 1998b) about this type of person, which is activated spontaneously when likable behaviors toward more powerful targets are observed. Thus, the identification of self-presentational motives does not always require a thoughtful attributional analysis; instead, the process may be quick and dirty (like other schema-driven operations)—quick, because it does not require any cognitive effort (Vonk, 1998b, Exp. 5; cf. Vonk, 1999e), and dirty, because it is diffuse and prone to error, so that an actor may erroneously be included into the schema once it has been activated (Vonk, 1998b, Exp. 4).

People who are likable toward more powerful targets and unlikable toward less powerful targets are judged negatively. In fact, they are judged just as negatively as people who are unlikable toward everyone (Vonk, 1998b, Exp. 1). There are at least two reasons for the aversiveness of this behavioral pattern. First, the likable behaviors toward more powerful targets are not only discounted as uninformative about the actor's true likability, but they also demonstrate that the actor has violated the authenticity norm. Second, unlikable behaviors toward powerless targets are judged more negatively than the same behaviors toward powerful targets (Vonk, 1999a), perhaps because it is worse to harm those who are not in a position to stand up for themselves or retaliate (cf. the previously mentioned study by S. H. Kim et al., 1998, which suggests that self-presenters are aware of the norm against negative treatment of a less powerful other).

In sum, the dependence relationship between the actor and the target is a crucial cue used by observers in inferring whether likable behaviors are genuine. If likable behavior is directed upward only, it is dismissed as utterly uninformative. Thus, although likability cannot be demonstrated by means of performance, it seems that observers rely on a person's behaviors toward less powerful others when they want to verify whether an actor is truly

likable. If these behaviors are less favorable, observers instantly form a disagreeable picture of the actor.

In addition to dependence, other cues are used by observers in determining whether likable behavior is truthful. In the case of flattery or opinion conformity, observers can examine whether the flattery is consistent with the actual qualities of the target. For instance, when a lecturer with fancy video materials but a lousy lecture is complimented on the clarity of the talk, the flatterer is more likely to be suspected of ingratiation than when the compliment concerns the video. From the perspective of the uninvolved observer, this means the flattery has to be deserved: When the observer feels the compliment is not justified by qualities of the target, the flatterer is more likely to be suspected of ulterior motives.

From the perspective of the target, the flattery has to match the target's self-concept to be seen as credible (cf. S. C. Jones & Schneider, 1968). Because most people have a positive self-concept, this may explain why ingratiators are generally judged more favorably by those who are the target of the ingratiation than by uninvolved observers (E. E. Jones, Stires, Shaver, & Harris, 1968; see Gordon, 1996, for a meta-analysis). In the example above, the lecturer may have a more optimistic view of his or her speech than the audience and, hence, be more likely to assign credibility to a compliment about the speech. E. E. Jones (1964) has described this difference in terms of "vain distortion" (p. 77): It is more rewarding to uncritically accept lavish praise directed toward the self than toward someone else, because it boosts one's ego.

It should be noted that this "vain distortion effect" may be produced by both motivational and cognitive variables (Vonk, 1999d). On the motivational side, people aim to protect and enhance their self-esteem, so they are motivated to accept flattery at face value. In addition, people are not only motivated to be liked, but also to like those with whom they interact because they want the interaction to be pleasant (e.g., Berscheid, Graziano, Monson, & Dermer, 1976; Vonk, 1998a). So, they are probably not keen on questioning the motives of their interaction partners, because this might produce decreased liking for these people.

On the cognitive side, several variables work against a critical examination of an ingratiator's behavior toward oneself. First, because one is involved in the interaction oneself, cognitive resources are consumed by having to manage one's own part of the interaction (Osborne & Gilbert, 1992). As a result, it is more likely that the actor's behavior is taken at face value, because one lacks the attention resources required to engage in a sophisticated attribution analysis of the actor's motives (Gilbert, Krull, & Pelham, 1988). Second, most people have a positive self-concept. Therefore, an ingratiator typically confirms what they already knew—that they are likable, competent people whose opinions are accurate. Expectancy-consistent information, whether it pertains to the self or to others, is un-

likable. If these behaviors are less favorable, observers instantly form a disagreeable picture of the actor.

In addition to dependence, other cues are used by observers in determining whether likable behavior is truthful. In the case of flattery or opinion conformity, observers can examine whether the flattery is consistent with the actual qualities of the target. For instance, when a lecturer with fancy video materials but a lousy lecture is complimented on the clarity of the talk, the flatterer is more likely to be suspected of ingratiation than when the compliment concerns the video. From the perspective of the uninvolved observer, this means the flattery has to be deserved: When the observer feels the compliment is not justified by qualities of the target, the flatterer is more likely to be suspected of ulterior motives.

From the perspective of the target, the flattery has to match the target's self-concept to be seen as credible (cf. S. C. Jones & Schneider, 1968). Because most people have a positive self-concept, this may explain why ingratiators are generally judged more favorably by those who are the target of the ingratiation than by uninvolved observers (E. E. Jones, Stires, Shaver, & Harris, 1968; see Gordon, 1996, for a meta-analysis). In the example above, the lecturer may have a more optimistic view of his or her speech than the audience and, hence, be more likely to assign credibility to a compliment about the speech. E. E. Jones (1964) has described this difference in terms of "vain distortion" (p. 77): It is more rewarding to uncritically accept lavish praise directed toward the self than toward someone else, because it boosts one's ego.

It should be noted that this "vain distortion effect" may be produced by both motivational and cognitive variables (Vonk, 1999d). On the motivational side, people aim to protect and enhance their self-esteem, so they are motivated to accept flattery at face value. In addition, people are not only motivated to be liked, but also to like those with whom they interact because they want the interaction to be pleasant (e.g., Berscheid, Graziano, Monson, & Dermer, 1976; Vonk, 1998a). So, they are probably not keen on questioning the motives of their interaction partners, because this might produce decreased liking for these people.

On the cognitive side, several variables work against a critical examination of an ingratiator's behavior toward oneself. First, because one is involved in the interaction oneself, cognitive resources are consumed by having to manage one's own part of the interaction (Osborne & Gilbert, 1992). As a result, it is more likely that the actor's behavior is taken at face value, because one lacks the attention resources required to engage in a sophisticated attribution analysis of the actor's motives (Gilbert, Krull, & Pelham, 1988). Second, most people have a positive self-concept. Therefore, an ingratiator typically confirms what they already knew—that they are likable, competent people whose opinions are accurate. Expectancy-consistent information, whether it pertains to the self or to others, is unlikely to be examined critically. Therefore, it makes sense that targets of ingratiation assign more credibility to the behavior than uninvolved observers, who have no existing positive expectancy about the target.

In everyday life, there is still another reason why targets of ingratiation may often fail to recognize the ulterior motives of the flatterer. In many cases, people only know how they themselves are treated by a person, and not how this person treats others—others who are perhaps less powerful and treated less nicely. As noted earlier, this kind of information is essential in allowing a confident inference of ulterior motivation. Unfortunately, powerful people in particular often lack information about how their subordinates behave toward other subordinates, if only because they often do not have the time and the motivation to keep track of all the behaviors of their employees (cf. Fiske, 1993). Seeing that a subordinate is friendly and supportive toward them, they are bound to like this person. We may assume that many leaders remain in this sweet state of ignorance, while their subordinates gnash their teeth watching how one of their colleagues "butters up" the boss (Vonk, 1998b, p. 861).

In summary, from the perspective of the target, ingratiation is not aversive at all. Therefore, it is likely to have the desired effect precisely with those for whom it is intended. In this scenario, there are clearly payoffs for everyone involved (cf. E. E. Jones, 1964). The target's self-concept is bolstered and verified. The target probably reciprocates the liking expressed by the ingratiator and admires his or her good judgment of character. As a result, the ingratiator is more likely to achieve the desired goal (e.g., a promotion). In the end, everybody is happy—except the observer; the subordinate who knows how the ingratiator has treated the less powerful and who becomes an involuntary witness to the excruciatingly unjust success of "brownnosing." This particular scenario probably illustrates the true meaning of aversive better than any of the examples described in this chapter.

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

In many ways, self-presentation has both positive and negative facets. First, desirable as well as undesirable behaviors can result from self-presentational motives. The survey among readers of the journal *Psychology* indicates that, although positive behaviors are more frequently motivated by self-presentational concerns, everyday life provides plenty of instances of intentional negative self-presentations. People present themselves as foolish and ignorant, hostile and threatening, cold and aloof, dependent and helpless, all for reasons that seem sensible enough. That is, people often have good reasons to engage in bad behaviors, and they are willing to incur losses in some domains to achieve gains in others.

Second, behaviors that are positive from the perspective of the actor may be negative from the observer's perspective or vice versa. For instance, we have seen that playing dumb, a behavior that may be classified as negative, very often serves to protect the self-esteem of others or to avoid envy and competitiveness. Hence, this behavior is often beneficial in social interaction. Conversely, positive self-presentations such as self-promotion and ingratiation may be perceived negatively by others, as became evident in the last part of this chapter.

Third, in addition to the different perspectives of the actor and the audience, there is also a difference between targets and uninvolved observers. This difference is germane to ingratiation, where the behavior is highly hedonically relevant to the target. In these cases, targets and observers may differ widely in their assessment of the behavior. In fact, the more pleasing the behavior is for the target, the more aversive it usually is for the observer.

Finally, the phenomenon of self-presentation can be evaluated both positively and negatively. On the one hand, we expect people to flexibly adapt their behavior to the setting, to stick to certain role requirements, and to suppress their natural instincts at least part of the time. On the other hand, there is also a strong authenticity norm in our society, which prescribes that people show their true thoughts and feelings and present themselves the way they really are. As a consequence, the mere occurrence of self-presentation is often evaluated negatively. This implies that, in a way, members of our culture receive two conflicting messages. On the one hand, they should show their true nature, behave in the same way in different settings and toward different people, and not be bothered with what others think (cf. M. R. Leary, 1995). On the other hand, they should conform to social roles, care about others' feelings, and thus refrain from expressing their every thought and enacting their every urge. In addition, it is also clear enough that, to get ahead in life, it is necessary to be likable toward the more powerful and to stress one's accomplishments and hide one's weaknesses. However, these are precisely the self-presentational behaviors judged as most undesirable by others.

There is only one way out of this catch-22, and it is what we all probably do most of the time: We engage in self-presentation, but not conspicuously so. We walk a fine line between the two competing requirements from our culture. We carefully dose the level of true self that we reveal—not too much, not too little, depending on the setting. We can fall on either side of the line. On some occasions, we let ourselves go. We talk too much or too loudly, we forget table manners, or we show our superiors what we really think of them. On other occasions, our presentation becomes too blatant. We laugh at our supervisor's joke before it's finished, we drop just one accomplishment too many saying that "It was nothing," or we use a foreign word but pronounce it incorrectly (e.g.,

Second, behaviors that are positive from the perspective of the actor may be negative from the observer's perspective or vice versa. For instance, we have seen that playing dumb, a behavior that may be classified as negative, very often serves to protect the self-esteem of others or to avoid envy and competitiveness. Hence, this behavior is often beneficial in social interaction. Conversely, positive self-presentations such as self-promotion and ingratiation may be perceived negatively by others, as became evident in the last part of this chapter.

Third, in addition to the different perspectives of the actor and the audience, there is also a difference between targets and uninvolved observers. This difference is germane to ingratiation, where the behavior is highly hedonically relevant to the target. In these cases, targets and observers may differ widely in their assessment of the behavior. In fact, the more pleasing the behavior is for the target, the more aversive it usually is for the observer.

Finally, the phenomenon of self-presentation can be evaluated both positively and negatively. On the one hand, we expect people to flexibly adapt their behavior to the setting, to stick to certain role requirements, and to suppress their natural instincts at least part of the time. On the other hand, there is also a strong authenticity norm in our society, which prescribes that people show their true thoughts and feelings and present themselves the way they really are. As a consequence, the mere occurrence of self-presentation is often evaluated negatively. This implies that, in a way, members of our culture receive two conflicting messages. On the one hand, they should show their true nature, behave in the same way in different settings and toward different people, and not be bothered with what others think (cf. M. R. Leary, 1995). On the other hand, they should conform to social roles, care about others' feelings, and thus refrain from expressing their every thought and enacting their every urge. In addition, it is also clear enough that, to get ahead in life, it is necessary to be likable toward the more powerful and to stress one's accomplishments and hide one's weaknesses. However, these are precisely the self-presentational behaviors judged as most undesirable by others.

There is only one way out of this catch-22, and it is what we all probably do most of the time: We engage in self-presentation, but not conspicuously so. We walk a fine line between the two competing requirements from our culture. We carefully dose the level of true self that we reveal—not too much, not too little, depending on the setting. We can fall on either side of the line. On some occasions, we let ourselves go. We talk too much or too loudly, we forget table manners, or we show our superiors what we really think of them. On other occasions, our presentation becomes too blatant. We laugh at our supervisor's joke before it's finished, we drop just one accomplishment too many saying that "It was nothing," or we use a foreign word but pronounce it incorrectly (e.g., Americans attempting to pronounce Van Gogh in Dutch). It's hard to tell which side of the line is more aversive.

REFERENCES

Arkin, R. M., & Baumgardner, A. H. (1985). Self-handicapping. In J. H. Harvey & G. Weary (Eds.), *Attribution: Basic issues and applications* (pp. 169–202). New York: Academic Press.

Axelrod, R. (1984). *The evolution of cooperation*. New York: Basic Books.

Bargh, J. A., Gollwitzer, P. M., Lee Chai, A., & Barndollaer, K. (1998). *Bypassing the will: Nonconscious self-regulation through automatic goal pursuit*. Manuscript submitted for publication.

Baumeister, R. F., Cooper, J., & Skib, B. A. (1979). Inferior performance as a selective response to expectancy: Taking a dive to make a point. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37*, 424–432.

Baumeister, R. F., & Leary, M. R. (1992). The need to belong: Desire for interpersonal attachments as a fundamental human motivation. *Psychological Bulletin, 117*, 497–529.

Baumeister, R. F., & Scher, S. J. (1988). Self-defeating behavior patterns among normal individuals: Review and analysis of common self-destructive tendencies. *Psychological Bulletin, 104*, 3–22.

Baumgardner, A. H., & Arkin, R. M. (1987). Coping with the prospect of social disapproval: Strategies and sequelae. In C. R. Snyder & C. E. Ford (Eds.), *Clinical and social psychological perspectives on negative life events* (pp. 323–346). New York: Plenum Press.

Baumgardner, A. H., & Brownlee, E. A. (1987). Strategic failure in social interaction: Evidence for expectancy-disconfirmation processes. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52*, 525–535.

Beauvois, J. L., & Dubois, N. (1988). The norm of internality in the explanation of psychological events. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 18*, 299–316.

Berscheid, E., Graziano, W., Monson, T., & Dermer, M. (1976). Outcome dependency: Attention, attribution, and attraction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34*, 978–989.

Braginsky, B. (1981). On being surplus: Its relation to impression management and mental patienthood. In J. T. Tedeschi (Ed.), *Impression management theory and social psychological research* (pp. 295–309). New York: Academic Press.

Brown, B. R. (1968). The effects of need to maintain face in interpersonal bargaining. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 4*, 107–122.

Buss, A. H., & Briggs, S. R. (1984). Drama and the self in social interaction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47*, 1310–1324.

Carnevale, P. J. D., Pruitt, D. G., & Britton, S. D. (1979). Looking tough: The negotiator under constituent surveillance. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 5*, 118–121.

Cosmides, L. (1989). The logic of social exchange: Has natural selection shaped how humans reason? *Cognition, 31*, 187–276.

Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (1992). Cognitive adaptations for social exchange. In J. H. Barkow, L. Cosmides, & J. Tooby (Eds.), *The adapted mind* (pp. 163–228). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Daubman, K. A., Heatherington, L., & Ahn, A. (1992). Gender and the self-presentation of academic achievement. *Sex Roles, 27*, 187–204.

Dean, D., Braito, R., Powers, E., & Brant, B. (1975). Cultural contradictions and sex roles revisited: A replication and reassessment. *Sociological Quarterly, 16*, 207–215.

DePaulo, B. M., & Bell, K. L. (1996). Truth and investment: Lies are told to those who care. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71*, 703–716.

DePaulo, B. M., & Kashy, D. A. (1998). Everyday lies in close and casual relationships. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74*, 63–79.

Ebbesen, E. B. (1981). Cognitive processes in inferences about a person's personality. In E. T. Higgins, C. P. Herman, & M. P. Zanna (Eds.), *Social cognition: The Ontario Symposium* (Vol. 1). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Exline, J. J. (1999, April). Woeful winners, lonely leaders, and holy rollers: STTUC in the gaze of the green-eyed monster. Seminar conducted at the annual meeting of the Christian Association for Psychological Studies, Colorado Springs, CO.

Exline, J. J., & Lobel, M. (1999). The perils of outperformance: Sensitivity about being the target of a threatening upward comparison. *Psychological Bulletin, 125*, 307–337.

Fein, S. (1996). Effects of suspicion on attributional thinking and the correspondence bias. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70*, 1164–1184.

Fein, S., Hilton, J. L., & Miller, D. T. (1990). Suspicion of ulterior motivation and the correspondence bias. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58*, 753–764.

Felson, R. B. (1978). Aggression as impression management. *Social Psychology, 41*, 205–213.

Felson, R. B., & Bohrnstedt, G. W. (1980). Attributions of ability and motivation in a natural setting. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39*, 799–805.

Fiske, S. T. (1993). Controlling other people: The impact of power on stereotyping. *American Psychologist, 48*, 621–628.

Gergen, K. J. (1968). Personal consistency and the presentation of the self. In C. Gordon & K. J. Gergen (Eds.), *The self in social interaction* (Vol. 1). New York: Wiley.

Gilbert, D. T., & Jones, E. E. (1986). Exemplification: The self-presentation of moral character. *Journal of Personality, 54*, 593–615.

Gilbert, D. T., Krull, D. S., & Pelham, B. W. (1988). Of thoughts unspoken: Social inference and the self-regulation of behavior. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55*, 685–694.

Cosmides, L. (1989). The logic of social exchange: Has natural selection shaped how humans reason? *Cognition, 31*, 187–276.

Cosmides, L., & Tooby, J. (1992). Cognitive adaptations for social exchange. In J. H. Barkow, L. Cosmides, & J. Tooby (Eds.), *The adapted mind* (pp. 163–228). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Daubman, K. A., Heatherington, L., & Ahn, A. (1992). Gender and the self-presentation of academic achievement. *Sex Roles, 27*, 187–204.

Dean, D., Braito, R., Powers, E., & Brant, B. (1975). Cultural contradictions and sex roles revisited: A replication and reassessment. *Sociological Quarterly, 16*, 207–215.

DePaulo, B. M., & Bell, K. L. (1996). Truth and investment: Lies are told to those who care. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71*, 703–716.

DePaulo, B. M., & Kashy, D. A. (1998). Everyday lies in close and casual relationships. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74*, 63–79.

Ebbesen, E. B. (1981). Cognitive processes in inferences about a person's personality. In E. T. Higgins, C. P. Herman, & M. P. Zanna (Eds.), *Social cognition: The Ontario Symposium* (Vol. 1). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Exline, J. J. (1999, April). Woeful winners, lonely leaders, and holy rollers: STTUC in the gaze of the green-eyed monster. Seminar conducted at the annual meeting of the Christian Association for Psychological Studies, Colorado Springs, CO.

Exline, J. J., & Lobel, M. (1999). The perils of outperformance: Sensitivity about being the target of a threatening upward comparison. *Psychological Bulletin, 125*, 307–337.

Fein, S. (1996). Effects of suspicion on attributional thinking and the correspondence bias. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70*, 1164–1184.

Fein, S., Hilton, J. L., & Miller, D. T. (1990). Suspicion of ulterior motivation and the correspondence bias. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 58, 753–764.

Felson, R. B. (1978). Aggression as impression management. *Social Psychology, 41*, 205–213.

Felson, R. B., & Bohrnstedt, G. W. (1980). Attributions of ability and motivation in a natural setting. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39*, 799–805.

Fiske, S. T. (1993). Controlling other people: The impact of power on stereotyping. *American Psychologist, 48*, 621–628.

Gergen, K. J. (1968). Personal consistency and the presentation of the self. In C. Gordon & K. J. Gergen (Eds.), *The self in social interaction* (Vol. 1). New York: Wiley.

Gilbert, D. T., & Jones, E. E. (1986). Exemplification: The self-presentation of moral character. *Journal of Personality, 54*, 593–615.

Gilbert, D. T., Krull, D. S., & Pelham, B. W. (1988). Of thoughts unspoken: Social inference and the self-regulation of behavior. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55*, 685–694.

Godfrey, D., Jones, E. E., & Lord, C. (1986). Self-promotion is not ingratiating. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50*, 106–115.

Goffman, E. (1959). *The presentation of self in everyday life*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday/Anchor Books.

Gollwitzer, P. M., & Wicklund, R. A. (1985). Self-symbolizing and the neglect of others' perspectives. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 48*, 702–715.

Gordon, R. A. (1996). Impact of ingratiation on judgments and evaluations: A meta-analytic investigation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 71*, 54–70.

Gove, W. R., Hughes, M., & Geerken, M. R. (1980). Playing dumb: A form of impression management with undesirable side effects. *Social Psychology Quarterly, 43*, 89–102.

Heider, F. (1958). *The psychology of interpersonal relations*. New York: Wiley.

Hill, M. G., Weary, G., & Williams, J. (1986). Depression: A self-presentation formulation. In R. Baumeister (Ed.), *Public self and private self* (pp. 213–239). New York: Springer.

Hogan, R., & Jones, W. H. (1983). A role theoretical model of criminal conduct. In W. S. Laufer & J. M. Days (Eds.), *Personality theory, moral development, and criminal behavior*. Boston: Lexington.

Horowitz, R., & Schwartz, G. (1974). Honor, normative ambiguity and gang violence. *American Sociological Review, 39*, 238–251.

Jellison, J. M., & Gentry, K. W. (1978). A self-presentational interpretation of the seeking of social approval. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 4*, 227–230.

Jellison, J. M., & Green, J. (1981). A self-presentation approach to the fundamental attribution error. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 40*, 643–649.

Jones, E. E. (1964). *Ingratiation*. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.

Jones, E. E. (1990). *Interpersonal perception*. New York: Freeman.

Jones, E. E., & Berglas, S. (1978). Control of attributions about the self through self-handicapping strategies: The role of alcohol and underachievement. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 4*, 200–206.

Jones, E. E., & Davis, K. E. (1965). From acts to dispositions: The attribution process in person perception. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 2, pp. 220–266). New York: Academic Press.

Jones, E. E., & Pittman, T. S. (1982). Toward a general theory of strategic self-presentation. In J. Suls (Ed.), *Psychological perspectives on the self* (Vol. 1, pp. 231–262). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Jones, E. E., Rhodewalt, F., Berglas, S. E., & Skelton, J. A. (1981). Effects of strategic self-presentation on subsequent self-esteem. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 41*, 407–421.

Jones, E. E., Stires, L. K., Shaver, K. G., & Harris, V. A. (1968). Evaluation of an

ingratiator by target persons and bystanders. *Journal of Personality, 36*, 349–385.

Jones, S. C., & Schneider, D. J. (1968). Certainty of self-appraisal and reactions to evaluations from others. *Sociometry, 31*, 395–403.

Kelly, A. E., McKillop, K. J., & Neimeyer, G. J. (1991). Effects of counsellor as audience on internalization of depressed and nondepressed self-presentations. *Journal of Counseling Psychology, 38*, 126–132.

Kiesler, D. J. (1983). The 1982 interpersonal circle: A taxonomy for complementarity in human transactions. *Psychological Review, 90*, 185–214.

Kim, M. P., & Rosenberg, S. (1980). Comparison of two structural models of implicit personality theory. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 38*, 375–389.

Kim, S. H., Smith, R. H., & Brigham, N. L. (1998). Effects of power imbalance and the presence of third parties on reactions to harm: Upward and downward revenge. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24*, 353–361.

Komarowski, M. (1946). Cultural contradiction and sex roles. *American Journal of Sociology, 52*, 184–189.

Kowalski, R. M. (1996). Complaints and complaining: Functions, antecedents, and consequences. *Psychological Bulletin, 119*, 179–196.

Leary, M. R. (1995). *Self-presentation: Impression management and interpersonal behavior*. Dubuque, IA: Brown & Benchmark.

Leary, T. (1957). *Interpersonal diagnosis of personality*. New York: Ronald.

Lingle, J. H., Dukerich, J. M., & Ostrom, T. M. (1983). Accessing information in memory-based impression judgments: Incongruity versus negativity in retrieval selectivity. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44*, 262–272.

Luginbuhl, J., & Palmer, R. (1991). Impression management aspects of self-handicapping: Positive and negative effects. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 17*, 655–662.

Miller, D. T., Norman, S. A., & Wright, E. (1978). Distortions in person perception as a consequence of the need for effective control. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36*, 598–602.

Osborne, R. E., & Gilbert, D. T. (1992). The preoccupational hazards of social life. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62*, 219–228.

Osgood, C. E., Suci, G. J., & Tannenbaum, P. H. (1957). *The measurement of meaning*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Paulhus, D. L. (1998). Interpersonal and intrapsychic adaptiveness of trait self-enhancement: A mixed blessing? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74*, 1197–1208.

Peeters, G., & Czapinski, J. (1990). Positive–negative asymmetry in evaluations: The distinction between affective and informational negativity effects. In W. Stroebe & M. Hewstone (Eds.), *European review of social psychology* (Vol. 1, pp. 33–60). Chichester, England: Wiley.

Pruitt, D. G., & Smith, D. L. (1981). Impression management in bargaining: Im-

ingratiator by target persons and bystanders. *Journal of Personality*, *36*, 349–385.

Jones, S. C., & Schneider, D. J. (1968). Certainty of self-appraisal and reactions to evaluations from others. *Sociometry*, *31*, 395–403.

Kelly, A. E., McKillop, K. J., & Neimeyer, G. J. (1991). Effects of counsellor as audience on internalization of depressed and nondepressed self-presentations. *Journal of Counseling Psychology*, *38*, 126–132.

Kiesler, D. J. (1983). The 1982 interpersonal circle: A taxonomy for complementarity in human transactions. *Psychological Review*, *90*, 185–214.

Kim, M. P., & Rosenberg, S. (1980). Comparison of two structural models of implicit personality theory. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *38*, 375–389.

Kim, S. H., Smith, R. H., & Brigham, N. L. (1998). Effects of power imbalance and the presence of third parties on reactions to harm: Upward and downward revenge. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 24, 353–361.

Komarowski, M. (1946). Cultural contradiction and sex roles. *American Journal of Sociology*, *52*, 184–189.

Kowalski, R. M. (1996). Complaints and complaining: Functions, antecedents, and consequences. *Psychological Bulletin*, *119*, 179–196.

Leary, M. R. (1995). *Self-presentation: Impression management and interpersonal behavior*. Dubuque, IA: Brown & Benchmark.

Leary, T. (1957). *Interpersonal diagnosis of personality*. New York: Ronald.

Lingle, J. H., Dukerich, J. M., & Ostrom, T. M. (1983). Accessing information in memory-based impression judgments: Incongruity versus negativity in retrieval selectivity. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *44*, 262–272.

Luginbuhl, J., & Palmer, R. (1991). Impression management aspects of self-handicapping: Positive and negative effects. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *17*, 655–662.

Miller, D. T., Norman, S. A., & Wright, E. (1978). Distortions in person perception as a consequence of the need for effective control. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *36*, 598–602.

Osborne, R. E., & Gilbert, D. T. (1992). The preoccupational hazards of social life. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *62*, 219–228.

Osgood, C. E., Suci, G. J., & Tannenbaum, P. H. (1957). *The measurement of meaning*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Paulhus, D. L. (1998). Interpersonal and intrapsychic adaptiveness of trait self-enhancement: A mixed blessing? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *74*, 1197–1208.

Peeters, G., & Czapinski, J. (1990). Positive–negative asymmetry in evaluations: The distinction between affective and informational negativity effects. In W. Stroebe & M. Hewstone (Eds.), *European review of social psychology* (Vol. 1, pp. 33–60). Chichester, England: Wiley.

Pruitt, D. G., & Smith, D. L. (1981). Impression management in bargaining: Images of firmness and trustworthiness. In J. T. Tedeschi (Ed.), *Impression management theory and social psychological research* (pp. 247–267). New York: Academic Press.

Reeder, G. D., & Brewer, M. B. (1979). A schematic model of dispositional attribution in interpersonal perception. *Psychological Review*, *86*, 61–79.

Reeder, G. D., & Fulks, J. L. (1980). When actions speak louder than words: Implicational schemata and the attribution of ability. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *16*, 33–46.

Reeder, G. D., & Spores, J. M. (1983). The attribution of morality. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *44*, 736–745.

Rhodewalt, F. (1986). Self-presentation and the phenomenal self: On the stability and malleability of self-conceptions. In R. F. Baumeister (Ed.), *Public self and private self* (pp. 117–142). New York: Springer-Verlag.

Rhodewalt, F., Sanbonmatsu, D. M., Tschanz, B., Feick, D. L., & Waller, A. (1995). Self-handicapping and interpersonal trade-offs: The effects of claimed self-handicaps on observers' performance evaluations and feedback. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *21*, 1042–1050.

Rosenberg, S. (1977). New approaches to the analysis of personal constructs in person perception. In J. K. Cole & A. W. Landfield (Eds.), *Nebraska symposium on motivation*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Rosenberg, S., Nelson, C., & Vivekananthan, P. S. (1968). A multidimensional approach to the structure of personality impressions. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 9, 283–294.

Rudman, L. A. (1998). Self-promotion as a risk factor for women: The costs and benefits of counterstereotypical impression management. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *74*, 629–645.

Schlenker, B. R. (1980). *Impression management: The self-concept, social identity, and interpersonal relations*. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.

Schlenker, B. R., & Leary, M. R. (1982). Audiences' reactions to self-enhancing, self-denigrating, and accurate self-presentations. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *18*, 89–104.

Schlenker, B. R., & Weigold, M. F. (1990). Self-consciousness and self-presentation: Being autonomous versus appearing autonomous. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *59*, 820–828.

Schneider, D. J. (1973). Implicit personality theory: A review. *Psychological Bulletin*, *79*, 294–309.

Schneider, D. J. (1981). Tactical self-presentations: Toward a broader conception. In J. T. Tedeschi (Ed.), *Impression management theory and social psychological research* (pp. 23–40). New York: Academic Press.

Schul, Y., & Burnstein, E. (1985). The informational basis of social judgments: Using past impression rather than the trait description in forming a new impression. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 21, 421–439.

Shepperd, J. A., & Socherman, R. E. (1997). On the manipulative behavior of

low machiavellians: Feigning incompetence to "sandbag" an opponent. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72*, 1448–1459.

Skowronski, J. J., & Carlston, D. E. (1987). Social judgment and social memory: The role of cue diagnosticity in negativity, positivity, and extremity biases. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52*, 689–699.

Smith, D. S., & Strube, M. J. (1991). Self-protective tendencies as moderators of self-handicapping impressions. *Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 12*, 63–80.

Smith, T. W., Snyder, C. R., & Handelsman, M. M. (1982). On the self-serving function of an academic wooden leg: Test anxiety as a self-handicapping strategy. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42*, 314–321.

Smith, T. W., Snyder, C. R., & Perkins, S. C. (1983). The self-serving function of hypochondriacal complaints: Physical symptoms as self-handicapping strategies. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44*, 787–797.

Snyder, M. (1974). The self-monitoring of expressive behavior. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 30*, 526–537.

Stone, J., Wiegand, A. W., Cooper, J., & Aronson, E. (1997). When exemplification fails: Hypocrisy and the motive for self-integrity. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72*, 54–65.

Tice, D. M., Butler, J. L., Muraven, M. B., & Stillwell, A. M. (1995). When modesty prevails: Differential favorability of self-presentation to friends and strangers. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69*, 1120–1138.

Vonk, R. (1993a). Individual differences and common dimensions in Implicit Personality Theory. *British Journal of Social Psychology, 32*, 209–226.

Vonk, R. (1993b). The negativity effect in trait ratings and in open-ended descriptions of persons. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19*, 269–278.

Vonk, R. (1995). Effects of inconsistent behavior on person impressions: A multidimensional study. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21*, 674–685.

Vonk, R. (1998a). Effects of cooperative and competitive outcome dependency on attention and impressions. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 34*, 265–288.

Vonk, R. (1998b). The slime effect: Suspicion and dislike of likeable behaviors toward superiors. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74*, 849–864.

Vonk, R. (1999a). Differential evaluations of likeable and dislikeable behaviours enacted toward superiors and subordinates. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 29*, 139–146.

Vonk, R. (1999b). Effects of other-profitability and self-profitability on evaluative judgements of behaviours. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 29*, 139–146.

Vonk, R. (1999c). Effects of outcome dependency on correspondence bias. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25*, 110–117.

Vonk, R. (1999d). *Self-serving interpretations of flattery: The dilemma of being ingratiated.* Manuscript submitted for publication.

Vonk, R. (1999e). Impression formation and impression management: Motives,

low machiavellians: Feigning incompetence to "sandbag" an opponent. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72,* 1448–1459.

Skowronski, J. J., & Carlston, D. E. (1987). Social judgment and social memory: The role of cue diagnosticity in negativity, positivity, and extremity biases. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52,* 689–699.

Smith, D. S., & Strube, M. J. (1991). Self-protective tendencies as moderators of self-handicapping impressions. *Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 12,* 63–80.

Smith, T. W., Snyder, C. R., & Handelsman, M. M. (1982). On the self-serving function of an academic wooden leg: Test anxiety as a self-handicapping strategy. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42,* 314–321.

Smith, T. W., Snyder, C. R., & Perkins, S. C. (1983). The self-serving function of hypochondriacal complaints: Physical symptoms as self-handicapping strategies. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44,* 787–797.

Snyder, M. (1974). The self-monitoring of expressive behavior. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 30,* 526–537.

Stone, J., Wiegand, A. W., Cooper, J., & Aronson, E. (1997). When exemplification fails: Hypocrisy and the motive for self-integrity. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72,* 54–65.

Tice, D. M., Butler, J. L., Muraven, M. B., & Stillwell, A. M. (1995). When modesty prevails: Differential favorability of self-presentation to friends and strangers. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69,* 1120–1138.

Vonk, R. (1993a). Individual differences and common dimensions in Implicit Personality Theory. *British Journal of Social Psychology, 32,* 209–226.

Vonk, R. (1993b). The negativity effect in trait ratings and in open-ended descriptions of persons. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19,* 269–278.

Vonk, R. (1995). Effects of inconsistent behavior on person impressions: A multidimensional study. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21,* 674–685.

Vonk, R. (1998a). Effects of cooperative and competitive outcome dependency on attention and impressions. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 34,* 265–288.

Vonk, R. (1998b). The slime effect: Suspicion and dislike of likeable behaviors toward superiors. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74,* 849–864.

Vonk, R. (1999a). Differential evaluations of likeable and dislikeable behaviours enacted toward superiors and subordinates. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 29,* 139–146.

Vonk, R. (1999b). Effects of other-profitability and self-profitability on evaluative judgements of behaviours. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 29,* 139–146.

Vonk, R. (1999c). Effects of outcome dependency on correspondence bias. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25,* 110–117.

Vonk, R. (1999d). *Self-serving interpretations of flattery: The dilemma of being ingratiated.* Manuscript submitted for publication.

Vonk, R. (1999e). Impression formation and impression management: Motives, traits, and likeability inferred from self-promoting and self-deprecating behavior. *Social Cognition, 17,* 390–412.

Vonk, R., & Van Knippenberg, A. (1994). The sovereignty of negative inferences: Suspicion of ulterior motives does not reduce the negativity effect. *Social Cognition, 12,* 169186.

Vonk, R., & Van Nobelen, D. (1993). Masculinity and femininity in the self with an intimate partner: Men are not always men in the company of women. *Journal of Personal and Social Relationships, 10,* 627–630.

Wall, J. A., Jr. (1991). Impression management in negotiations. In R. A. Giacalone & P. Rosenfeld (Eds.), *Applied impression management* (pp. 133–156). Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.

Weiner, B. (1986). *An attributional theory of motivation and emotion.* New York: Springer.

Wiggins, J. S. (1985). The interpersonal circle: A structural model for the integration of personality research. In R. Hogan (Ed.), *Perspectives in personality* (Vol. 1, pp. 1–47). New York: JAI Press.

Zanna, M. P., & Pack, S. J. (1975). On the self-fulfilling nature of apparent sex differences in behavior. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 11,* 583–591.